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Trading Profiles and Developing Country Participation 




There has been an undercurrent of worry around the WTO DS mechanism since its 
inception.  In particular, it has been alleged that the system is biased against developing 
countries. On the basis of this worry, there have been proposals for reform of the system to 
remedy perceived biases, particularly in dispute initiation. The starting point of research in 
this area is therefore a seemingly simple question.  “Do developing countries use the DS 
mechanism less than they ‘should’ based on objective criteria?”   
 
In our empirical analysis, we have tried to highlight aspects of this question, by improving 
on the earlier literature in several respects. First, we use a much richer dispute data set than 
has been used so far in the literature, by including all dispute initiation during the period 
1995-2006. Second, we focus more on the role of industrial structure than has been done in 
the literature. Third, we employ econometric techniques that, while not entirely new in the 
field, are more suitable to the situation at hand than what is often used. Our results suggest 
that the composition of trade, the volume of trade, income levels, aid levels, and legal 
capacity, explain the observed aggregate level of dispute initiation fairly well. Predictions 
from the empirical model also suggest that Low Income Developing countries (this group 
excludes least developed countries), have launched more complaints than they should have, 
based on these characteristics.  
 
Fourth, we use the estimated model to answer two fundamental questions concerning the 
determinants of Least Developed Country (LDC) participation as complainants, questions 
that to the best of our knowledge have not been highlighted in the literature. Our first 
question concerns the role of economic country size. It is often said that since LDCs 
typically are very small in terms of GDP, in terms of trade, etc, that they do not have 
incentives to launch disputes. We therefore make the thought-experiment of merging all 
LDCs into an “LDC Union” for the handling of complaints in the DS system. This Union is 
instructed to base its decisions concerning litigation on the combined exports of its 
members, and would draw on the combined resources of the countries in other respects. 
The model predicts that a country with the characteristics of this “LDC Union” would have   2
initiated roughly twice as many disputes as the model predicts that this group of countries 
would have launched if acting individually. One should be careful not to over-emphasize 
the validity of this magnitude. More interesting is that this experiment suggests that LDCs 
may have so few disputes not only because of small trade volumes, or because of small 
GDP levels, but also because of the interaction between such explanatory factors. 
 
The second question we examine  is the common perception in the policy literature that the 
LDC trade composition explains their seemingly low participation rates. To this end we 
make the further thought experiment of letting the export structure of this “LDC Union” be 
the same as the average of the exports of G2, Earlier Industrialized and Newly 
Industrialized countries, while keeping the total volume of exports unchanged. This “LDC 
Union” is hence in terms of industry export structure a replica of the richer countries, but is 
in other respects an aggregation of LDCs. Using the estimated model, this change in export 
composition would have a fairly limited impact on dispute initiation by LDC, contrary to 
what is often suggested.  In other words, the composition of trade does not appear to be a 
determining factor. 
 
We would finally like to emphasize the great caution that is needed when drawing policy 
conclusions based on observations concerning dispute initiation in the DS system. Such 
conclusions are inevitably based on a number of special assumptions that are typically not 
made explicit. For instance, there are conceptual problems with regard to the definition of 
the unit of account (“a dispute”) as well as relevant benchmarks, there are econometric 
problems with regard to how to distinguish the determinants of dispute initiation as well as 
how to handle the dominance of zeros in the data, there are data availability problems with 
regard to a number of important variables such as legal capacity and power. In addition, 
there are conceptual problems with regard to how to frame relevant and well-defined 
questions that can be answered within the model. We have here tried to address some of 
these problems, but many still remain. 
   3
1. Introduction 
The role of developing countries in the dispute settlement mechanisms of the multilateral 
trading system has steadily increased during the last 15 years. There are probably several 
reasons for this increasing interest. One is the dramatic increase in developing country 
membership, which today accounts for the vast majority of members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Another reason is the hopes attached to the creation of the dispute 
settlement (DS) mechanism of the WTO, which was intended to be less dependent on 
political or diplomatic solutions, and more on formal legal procedures. Yet another reason 
for the increased interest in the working of the DS mechanism is the increased reliance 
during this period on trade liberalization as a means of enhancing development. A core 
issue in this debate has been the limited use of the WTO DS mechanism by developing 
countries.  Over the last decade, a burgeoning academic literature (mainly in economics and 
political science) has focused on the extent to which developing countries can be said to be 
underrepresented, and if so, what the reasons are for their relatively limited participation.  
 
Three themes can be said to dominate this literature. One is the notion that the use of the 
DS system largely reflects commercial interests. The limited participation of developing 
countries, and in particular least developed countries, would according to this view reflect 
their smaller trade flows. For example, Horn et al (1999) show that the distribution of the 
actual disputes for the years 1995-98 across the Members of the WTO closely corresponds 
to the structure of global trade, leaving very little to be explained by other factors. A second 
theme is that low participation by developing countries reflects their limited legal and 
administrative capacity to identify illegalities, and to pursue complaints, and/or their 
inability to purchase such services from e.g. law firms. A third theme, often denoted the 
“power hypothesis”, is that developing countries abstain from launching complaints either 
from a fear that they will face retaliation by richer adversaries, or from a belief that they 
will not be able to enforce rulings by WTO courts in their favor. These three explanations 
of developing country participation are of course not mutually exclusive, and our 
understanding is that while authors may at times put particular emphasis on the findings of 
their own studies, there is a general agnosticism concerning their relative importance. 
Characteristic of all three types of explanations of the low participation rate of developing 
countries – trade structure, legal capacity and power considerations – is that 
underdevelopment is at the root of the problem. But while underdevelopment is the primal   4
force behind all three explanations, different policy prescriptions seem to follow from the 
explanations. If limited participation is explained by legal capacity, or to some extent 
power considerations, there is a problem with the way in which the WTO DS system 
works, and efforts may be justified to remedy this. Indeed, the Advisory Center on WTO 
Law is motivated by the perceived effects of lack of legal capacity on behalf of developing 
countries. On the other hand, if the use of the system mainly reflects trade structure (i.e. 
low gross volumes), there is less of a need to change the current DS system. A crucial 
question thus seems to be whether developing country participation in the DS system as 
complainants mainly reflects these countries’ trade structures or more directly their 
developing country status.  
 
The purposes of this study are two-fold. One is to shed light on the empirical question 
concerning the determinants of developing country participation in the DS system. In doing 
this we offer a number of contributions vis-à-vis the current literature.  The first is that we 
work with a dataset on dispute initiation that is significantly extended compared to what is 
employed in the current literature. Our data set contains all Requests for Consultations at 
the WTO from 1995 through the end of 2006 (i.e., the first full 12 years under the current 
DS system). This provides a much broader sample for identification of patterns than 
employed in most existing studies. The second contribution is that we examine the role of 
trade volumes in participation rates across broad industry sectors. The current literature 
generally focuses on aggregate trade volumes.  Our focus on sector patterns lets us further 
deconstruct the composition of trade as a potential explanation of developing country 
participation rates.  Finally, we attempt to directly confront the problems caused by the 
dominance of zeros in the data set (i.e., the dominance of country-product pairs without 
observed disputes within the DS system).  The second purpose of the study is to highlight a 
number of fundamental conceptual and data problems that beset the whole empirical 
literature that seeks to draw some form of policy conclusions based on participation in the 
DS system. While perhaps appreciated by researchers working in this area, these problems 
appear to go unnoticed by practitioners drawing on this literature.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the literature on 
the determinants of participation in the DS system. In Section 3 we develop our analytical 
framework for explaining participation rates.  Section 4 introduces the data that will be 
used to highlight the validity of the analytical framework. This is followed in Section 5 by   5
an informal view on the data. Section 6 provides a formal (econometric) analysis of our 
data.  Finally, in Section 7, we discuss our results and draw broader conclusions from the 
evidence.   
 
2. Background 
In this section we review the literature on the determinants of participation as complainants 
in the DS system. This review will be in two parts. We first point to a number of 
fundamental conceptual problems facing the literature. We then discuss more directly the 
literature. But since it is by now fairly sizeable, we will here only briefly point to a few 
studies that are of more direct relevance to the present study.
1  
 
2.1 Conceptual issues 
As mentioned above, there are a number of very serious conceptual problems facing the 
literature on developing country participation in the DS system. We will here point to some 
of them.  
 
2.1.1 What is “a” dispute? 
In order to analyze the degree of participation in the DS system, it is necessary to be able to 
count the number of disputes. This in turn requires a definition of the unit of account of a 
dispute. A fundamental conceptual problem faced by the entire literature is that of choosing 
the unit of account for disputes. That is, what is “a” dispute?  
 
From a data point of view, the simplest approach is to count each Request for Consultation 
as a separate dispute. Each such request is assigned a DS number by the WTO Secretariat, 
and there were 351 such disputes through December 2006. This is the approach taken in 
most of the more legally oriented literature that has sought to quantify participation in the 
DS system.  
 
Another possibility, followed in the more economics or political science related literature, 
is to identify bilateral disputes. On this view, each complainant (sometimes there is more 
than one complainant), is counted as having a dispute with the respondent. The 
                                                 
1 See Busch and Reinhardt (2002), or Horn and Mavroidis (2007), for a fuller account of the literature.   6
consequence of this is to increase considerably the total number of disputes. For instance, 
with this approach the Bananas dispute DS27 would count as five bilateral disputes, since 
in this case five countries complained.  
 
But there are also other aspects that could be taken account of. For instance, a large number 
of countries request to join consultations. It is not entirely clear whether these countries join 
because their interests coincide with those of the original complainant(s) or respondent, but 
it seems plausible that in most actual disputes, the joining countries have been on the side 
of the complainant(s). Also, even though not so frequent, sometimes essentially the same 
dispute appears under different DS numbers. Should they be viewed as the same or 
different disputes? There is furthermore also the question of how to view the way in which 
issues are “packaged” under a single DS number. If a complaint concerns two different 
measures affecting a particular product, is this to be viewed as two separate disputes which 
are just for convenience attacked in one complaint? 
 
It should be emphasized that there is no generally correct way of defining a dispute. What 
is important however is that the definition employed corresponds to the question asked. 
That is, the definition should be derived from an underlying theory. We are not aware of 
any such attempts to date, however. There is thus a huge conceptual void in the middle of 
the whole discussion concerning developing country participation in the DS system. 
 
2.1.2  What defines the non-biased situation? 
A second very serious issue for studies of biases in participation is how to define the non-
biased benchmark. Without such a benchmark, it is impossible to say whether developing 
countries are “under-represented” or not. At the same time, most of the policy discussion 
on participation seems to completely ignore the issue. Again, there is a need for better, and 
more explicitly worded, theory. 
 
2.1.3  Why are illegalities committed? 
A third question of great significance is why countries commit illegalities? It makes a 
significant difference to the evaluation of the DS system if illegalities are committed to 
defuse domestic political pressures, or to aggressively pursue national or interest group 
interests. In the former case, the illegalities may prevent measures that would seriously 
threaten the unlawfully acting country’s ability to maintain its commitments. There are   7
some attempts to address this issue in the theoretical literature, but there is very little 
empirical work on this issue, except for an interesting paper by Bown (2004b) who 
examines the determinants of countries’ choices of whether to violate or adhere to GATT 
rules when making trade policy changes during rounds.
2  
 
2.1.4  What do observed dispute represent? 
To date, there have been significantly less than 400 such disputes. At the same time 
countries have undertaken many millions of decisions with a trade impact, each of which is 
potentially the target of a complaint. A highly pertinent question is then what purpose these 
disputes achieve, and what can be learnt about the working of the system by looking at 
participation in the system? How do we explain the fact that these particular conflicts ended 
up as formal disputes at the WTO, while other conflicts did not? That is, what determines 
the selection of disputes that appear before the WTO? The registered disputes most likely 
differ from other trade conflicts. But how  do they differ? About this we know almost 
nothing. 
 
2.1.5  How do we interpret differences in participation? 
A central issue is clearly how to interpret the observation that a group of countries has 
launched few complaints. Perhaps the mere threat of complaints from this group sufficed to 
keep its trading partners at bay, partly due to the efficiency of the DS system. Or 
alternatively, perhaps one does not find it worthwhile to pursue disputes due to the poor 
functioning of the system. Or maybe certain countries are more fearful that if they 
complain, respondents will retaliate in some form. The same observation may thus lead us 
to completely different conclusions. We are not aware of any theoretical or empirical 
literature to guide us as to which is the better interpretation. 
 
2.2  The empirical literature on dispute initiation 
The literature on developing country participation in the DS system has focused on three 
sets of explanations. The first is that participation reflects commercial interests of countries. 
But the literature has also pointed to participation costs, legal capacity, and power politics 
as factors in the pattern of DS participation. According to the power hypothesis, developing 
countries abstain from launching disputes due to fear that they either will not be able to 
                                                 
2 See Bown (2002), Bütler and Hauser (2000), Grinols and Perrelli (2003), and Guzman (2003).   8
enforce rulings in their favor, or will be subjected to some form of revenge from more 
powerful countries if they do complain against them. In contrast, the legal capacity 
hypothesis holds that it is the limited ability of developing countries to detect illegalities 
and to litigate if illegalities are detected, given resource constraints, which puts developing 
countries at a disadvantage. 
 
2.2.1  Trade structure as a determinant of participation 
As noted above, a basic concern in the literature has been whether smaller and poorer WTO 
Members complain less often than they “should”.  Of course, it is highly likely that a 
country that exports many products to many markets and in large volumes will encounter 
more illegalities than a country that exports a few products in limited amounts to a few 
markets. The crucial question for determining any bias in the system is then how many 
more disputes the country with larger and more diversified exports should be involved in. 
Clearly, in order to address this issue, there is a need for a definition of an unbiased 
benchmark. Lacking any other plausible theory for the number of illegalities committed by 
each country, Horn et al (1999) assume that countries are equally prone to commit 
illegalities, in the sense that they do this with the same frequency for each imported 
product. Using data for the first four years of the WTO DS system, and with products 
defined at the 4-digit HS level, Horn et al (1999) show that the actual distribution of 
bilateral disputes across members are fairly well predicted by this benchmark, in particular 
when the latter is adjusted in order to exclude exports with smaller values (assuming that 
such values are not worth litigating over). This finding would thus suggest that the reason 
for the discrepancy between developed and developing countries in terms of complaints 
mainly reflects differences in trade interests. 
 
Several studies have significantly improved on this study, often coming to rather different 
conclusions in the process. Notably, Bown (2005) argues that the assumption in Horn et al 
(2006) that illegalities are randomly and uniformly distributed across markets, products and 
trading partners, is strong. In particular, illegalities may be committed more frequently 
against weaker countries that do not have the capacity to retaliate. To get around this 
selection problem, Bown (2005) focuses on the choice of countries to either pursue disputes 
by themselves, participate as co-complainants or as third parties, or not participate at all, 
possibly free-riding on the efforts of other countries. To this end, the study employs an 
ordered probit model, applied to data for the period 1995-2001. The data builds on the 116   9
disputes in which importing countries were determined to illegally restrict imports. Bown 
(2005) also identifies countries that were harmed by the illegal measure, but who did not 
participate in the legal process. It is shown that in disputes over measures that adversely 
affect many trading partners, the size of exports is positively related to the propensity to 
complain, in line with the finding of Horn et al (1999). It is also positively related to 
participation as a third party, and negatively related to the propensity to free ride. 
 
2.2.2 Legal capacity and “power” as determinants of participation 
Another important theme in the literature has been the role of limited legal capacity and 
limited economic “power” as restraints on developing country willingness to launch 
complains. The limited legal capacity of developing countries may prevent these countries 
from detecting illegalities, while their lack of “power” may make the enforcement of 
rulings to their favor difficult.  It may also potentially result in retaliatory actions such as 
loss of preferential treatment status in trade (or more onerous rules of origin), or reduced 
foreign aid. 
 
Horn et al use the size of countries’ WTO delegations in Geneva as a proxy for countries’ 
legal capacity and find that countries with more legal capacity litigate more, controlling for 
trade interests. However, this relationship is rather weak in their study. Dividing countries 
into four groups, G4, other OECD countries, developing countries other than LDCs, and 
LDCs, the study finds that developing countries other than LDCs are actually over-
represented as complainants against both G4 countries and against other OECD countries. 
On the other hand, LDCs seem to be underrepresented as complainants against developed 
countries, but this finding is uncertain due to the very small share of LDCs in world trade. 
Bown (2005) also uses the size of Geneva delegations as a proxy for legal capacity, but the 
variable is insignificant. 
 
Another study on this theme is that of Guzman and Simmons (2005), who consider bilateral 
disputes in the WTO between 1995 and April 2004, as defined by Requests for 
Consultations. In addition to the commonly employed variable capturing the size of 
countries’ Geneva delegations, Guzman and Simmons (2005) include the number of 
embassies abroad, countries’ non-military government expenditures, and an index for the 
quality of government bureaucracies. Overall, Guzman and Simmons (2005) see their 
results as supporting the primacy of the legal capacity rather than power as an explanation   10
of the choice of respondents. Because of legal resource constraints, developing countries 
are more selective as to which cases they challenge before the WTO. 
 
The notion of “power” mentioned above is of course extremely vague, and could 
encompass a large number of aspects. As a measure of bilateral power relations, Horn et al 
(1999) use differences in GDP levels, but find little support for such a notion of power to 
matter. Bown (2005) uses two alternative measures of power. One of these is the trade 
retaliation capacity as proxied by fraction of the exporter’s exports that goes to the 
importer. The estimated coefficient is positive, as expected, and significant.  
 
One more specific aspect of power in international relations is the possibility for either 
party to withdraw foreign aid if faced by undesirable behavior by the other party. The role 
of aid for participation as complainants has been highlighted in a couple of studies. Bown 
(2005) includes bilateral aid in both directions. Bown (2005) argues that the more reliant an 
importing country is on the exporting country for development assistance, the more aid the 
exporting country could threaten to withdraw, and thus the more likely that the respondent 
would implement market-access commitments. However, Bown also notes that the 
respondent’s reliance on aid from the exporter could indicate a special relationship between 
the two countries that might decrease the likelihood of complaints. The importer’s bilateral 
aid dependence is measured by the aid received by the importer from the exporter as a 
fraction of the importer’s national income. This variable is shown to be significantly 
negative, partly in contradiction with a power hypothesis.  
 
Bown (2005) also examines the impact of the exporter’s bilateral aid dependence. The 
coefficient for this variable, which is measured symmetrically, is shown to be significantly 
negative, as a power-based theory would predict. Hence, bilateral aid dependence reduces 
dispute participation, regardless of the direction of the aid.  
 
A second study that illuminates the role of aid is undertaken by Zejan and Bartels (2006).
3 
They examine two aspects of aid dependence. The specification of direct relevance to the 
present paper is one where the probability of country i launching a dispute against j is 
                                                 
3 While not addressing the same issue as is at stake here, it can be noted that Besson and Mehdi (2004) also 
highlight the role of aid, when examining determinants of whether developing countries win disputes. Basing 
their study on a sample of 40 disputes, and estimating a binomial probit model, they find among other things 
that dependence on bilateral foreign aid reduces the probability of winning a dispute against the donor.   11
higher the less aid i received from j, the higher the GDP of i, the more trade dependent is i 
and the larger is its legal capacity.
4 The data employed covers the years 1995-2001 and 
concerns trade between developing countries and the EU and the US, respectively. When 
using probit regressions to estimate the model for both the EU and the US, the authors find 
some, albeit week, support for the proposition that developing countries complain less 
when they are more aid-dependent. When running separate estimations for the EU and the 
US, the relationship with the EU is found to be influenced by such considerations, but not 
that with the US. However, a closer statistical examination does not suggest any structural 




2.2.3 Other factors explaining participation 
The literature contains several alternative factors as explanations for developing country 
complaints in the DS system. For instance, a frequent finding is that countries tend to 
complain less against members of the same preferential trade agreement to which they 
themselves belong.  (As an example, see Bown 2005).  
 
Another explanation is sought in the political systems of the potential complainants. 
Reinhardt (2000) examines a number of aspects of this issue, one being whether 
democracies are more or less likely to complain before the WTO. A number of theoretical 
arguments can be made in either direction, so while it seems plausible that the political 
system may affect the propensity to complain, the direction is unclear. Reinhardt finds 
however, that the more democratic a state is, the more it will initiate disputes, controlling 
for the trading countries’ relative size, and for one country’s dependence on trade with the 
other. There is also a strong tendency for democracies to be targeted more often. One 
possible explanation is that democratic governments find it harder to resist demands for 
protection, and will therefore be more prone to be pressured into committing illegalities. 
Reinhardt also finds that a country is more likely to initiate disputes against trading partners 
                                                 
4 The other specification hypothesizes that the amount of aid received by a country i from a country j is lower, 
the larger the number of disputes that country i launch against country j, the lower the GDP per capita of i, 
and the less trade dependent i is. This specification thus attempts to capture how aid is used to punish poorer 
countries that do use the DSB. 
5 This examination is performed using a likelihood ratio test, which effectively compares the log likelihood 
scores of from the two separate maximum likelihood estimations to see whether there is a significant 
difference in the relationship between aid dependence and dispute initiation for the and the US.   12
that stand for large shares of the country’s imports and exports, and also against countries 
that depend on it for their imports and exports, partly in line with what is found by Bown. 
 
Yet another factor potentially affecting the propensity to initiate disputes is previous 
targeting for complaints. To capture such considerations, Reinhardt (2000) includes a 
binary variable indicating whether in the previous year the respondent initiated a dispute 
against the complainant. It is indeed found that a dispute in the previous year very 
significantly increases the probability of a dispute in the opposite direction the year 
thereafter. Bown also discusses the role of retaliation in several papers, finding support for 
its deterrent impact. (See Bown 2002, 2004a, 2004b). Yet another study with similar 
findings is that by Blonigen and Bown (2003), who employ disaggregated data from 
antidumping investigations 
 
3. Analytical  framework 
We are interested in the reasons why countries take trade conflicts to the WTO DS system 
for adjudication. Our motivation is the question of whether there is some “bias” in the 
extent to which countries use the system. In particular, we want to explore the extent to 
which trade structure can explain the number of disputes that developing countries launch, 
controlling for other factors associated with underdevelopment.  
 
As noted above, a generic problem for the whole literature on the use of the DS system is 
arbitrariness in the definition of the unit of account of a conflict. As we see it, a Request for 
Consultations in the DS system could be seen as a “package” of conflicts in several 
dimensions. For instance, the same request typically mentions a number of legal provisions 
that are allegedly being violated, often indicating that what is called a “measure” in reality 
consists of a number of different decisions; Hoekman, Horn and Mavroidis (2007) provide 
some descriptive statistics regarding this aspect of the DS system.  
 
In this study we unravel this packaging across two dimensions.  Specifically, we treat 
Requests for Consultations as aggregating trade conflicts in two dimensions: over 
complainants, and over products. Before studying the determinants of dispute initiation, we 
need to “unpack” the data on DS disputes. To this end, we will assume, first, that each 
complainant participating in a request is involved in a bilateral dispute with the respondent   13
(which always is a single country). Second, we will assume that each industry that is 
involved in a DS dispute represents a separate dispute. 
 
Before engaging in formal empirical analysis, it is necessary to first specify a theoretical or 
analytical framework spelling out how various factors may influence dispute initiation. We 
do this for two reasons.  This first is simply that it ensures some rigor when we examine the 
data.  In particular we will be able to refute the theory if the data turn out to tell another 
story than the theory we spell out here. Another reason to formalizing these relationships is 
that it allows us to show that the kind of implicit theory underlying the claims in much of 
the DS literature is much more elaborate, and special, than acknowledged. 
 
Our framework, which will be concerned with litigation concerning import-restricting 
measures at an industry level, builds on a number of relationships. At a very general level, 
we stipulate that the number of complaints that an exporting country (indexed by i) has 
against an importing country (indexed by j), is larger: 
 
(i)  the larger the number of illegalities that country i detects that are committed by j 
against i; and  
(ii) the larger the gains from pursuing a dispute when an illegality is identified. 
 
We do not know how to measure directly either of these entities, and for this reason we 
need to go behind each of them, disentangling them into factors that are more readily 
measurable. We start by assuming that the number of illegalities that country i detects that 
are committed by j: 
  
     (i)  increase with the number of illegalities that are committed; and  
     (ii) increase with the probability of detecting a typical illegality.  
 
We observe neither of these entities, of course. It is here natural to follow the literature and 
assume that more realized exports are likely to impose a stronger pressure on local 
producers, all else given, and that one would for this reason expect a positive relationship 
between exports and the number of committed illegalities. But it could also be argued that a 
low export volume may signal that many illegalities are committed. On this view, there 
would be a negative relation between export values and number of committed illegalities   14
when we control for other factors. Our intuition suggests that the former factor normally 
dominates in the data. However, if we are to see a significant negative relationship, we at 
least have a plausible explanation. 
 
We next turn to the probability that exporter i detects a committed illegality in j. In general 
terms, it seems reasonable to suppose that, for a given level of exports, the probability of 
detection increases in the legal capacity of the exporting country i. In the literature, it is in 
this context explicitly referred to as the capacity of official bodies, such as trade ministries, 
to detect illegalities. Of course, in practice the capacity of the private sector may be at least 
as important. We are touching here on a highly complex and under-researched area – the 
political economy of dispute initiation, and for practical purposes we need to stay with the 
simplistic description employed here.  
 
Let us now turn to the gain for country i from launching a dispute against j. We assume that 
it is influenced by three factors:  
 
(i)   the probability that country i wins against j if an illegality is detected and litigated  
     (ii)  the direct gain for country i if it wins in litigation against j 
     (iii) the expected retaliation by j  
 
Again, we need to go behind each of these factors in order to specify a theory that can be 
confronted with data. To this end, we take it that (i) the probability that country i wins 
against j if an illegality is detected and litigated increases in the legal capacity of exporter i, 
and decreases in the legal capacity of importer j.  
 
We also assume that (ii) the direct gain for country i if winning in litigation against j is 
larger the surplus from trade that is at stake (export value will be used as a proxy), and the 
better are the enforcement possibilities. The latter is assumed to increase in own national 
income and fall in that of the other country.  
 
Finally, (iii) the expected retaliation by j is smaller the lower the potential cost of retaliation 
by importer j against exporter i. There are of course many forms that such retaliation could 
take. The literature has pointed to the tendency for retaliation in complaints, whereby a 
complaint by i against j is met by a complaint in the opposite direction. We will here focus   15
in particular on the developed-developing country dimension, and account for the 





The model described thus far does not have any explicit industry dimension. However, 
there are at least two ways in which the industry structure may enter the picture. First, the 
forces we have just described are likely to differ in strength across industries. Since 
countries differ in industry structure, they are for this reason likely to differ in their 
propensity to initiate disputes. Second, it seems intuitively plausible that the degree of 
conflict differs across consultation requests. Certain requests concern only a very specific 
issue, hitting only a narrow range of the potential trade between two countries, while other 
complaints concern measures that are much wider in their effects. To capture some aspect 
of this difference, we will define our disputes on an industry level (we will below describe 
exactly how this is done).  
 
The model laid out above can thus be summarized as follows: The number of complaints by 
exporting country i against importing country j in industry g ( ijg DISP ) is higher:
8 
 
•  the greater exports of country i to country j in industry g ( ijg X ); 






•  the greater the legal capacity of exporter i  ( i L ); 
•  the less the legal capacity of importer j ( j L );  
•  the greater the national income of exporter i ( i Y ); and  
                                                 
6 It would also be natural to include the withdrawal of preferential tariff treatment. However, as with 
preferential trading agreement, one would have to consider very carefully the real preference margin when 
taking account of rules of origin requirements, and the costs of verifying these. This requires a study on its 
own. (See e.g. Francois, Hoekman, and Manchin (2006) for such an attempt.) 
7 Another alternative is the power measure used by Bown (2005), discussed on page 10, which is the fraction 
of the exporter’s export that goes to the importer. This can be used as a proxy for the importer’s capacity for 
trade retaliation. However, since in our model this fraction also captures the probability that an illegality is 
committed, such a measure would be difficult to interpret. 
8 It could be hypothesized to be lower if the two countries are members of the same preferential trading 
agreement. However, these agreements vary hugely in terms of what they in practice entail. A satisfactory 
inclusion of a preferential trading agreement variable would therefore require a careful examination of the 
actual content of each bilateral match of countries with regard to preferential trading agreement that is far 
beyond the scope of the paper.    16
•  the less the national income of importer j ( j Y ). 
 
Note on the last variable that there are clearly factors that work in opposite direction to 
what we discuss above.  For example, higher income countries may pose a greater benefit 
from improved market access (pointing to a positive coefficient), while the probability of 
winning may also be reduced (pointing to a negative coefficient). It is also conceivable that 
it is easier to find co-complainants for larger markets. 
 
While this specifies the explanatory variables we build on, and the direction in which they 
are expected to influence dispute initiation, the theory is still silent on specifically how the 
various factors enter – what type of mathematical relationship they stand in. To make the 
model amendable to statistical analysis we could impose more specific assumptions to 
describe how these variables are assumed to be interrelated. Needless to say, there are many 
theoretical specifications that could seem reasonable here, and it is not clear how to choose 
among these. Since this inevitably arbitrary choice of functional form may importantly 
affect the outcome of the investigation, the standard approach in the literature is to abstain 
from such a specification, and to let the variables enter in an additive fashion. However, 
unfortunately this approach does not solve the problem with arbitrariness, since also an 
additive representation is implicitly based on specific assumptions concerning the 
relationships between the variables. In this study we will use a different formulation than 
the standard additive model, for reasons to be explained below. 
 
We believe that the theory laid out above is about as plausible as any other presented in the 
literature.  But as is obvious from the discussion above, even a simple formulation where 
dispute initiation is partly determined by trade structure, partly by legal capacity and partly 
by power considerations, becomes very elaborate on closer examination. 
 
4.   Data 
We turn next to our data.  It is convenient to first describe our explanatory variables (trade 
flows, national incomes, aid flows, and legal capacity), before describing how we construct 
the variable to be explained – dispute initiation.  
 
4.1  Country definitions   17
A couple of comments regarding the countries included in the data set. First, throughout the 
study, we will let “EC” denote EU-15, the members of the EU before the enlargement in 
May 2004. We will treat the few DS disputes where EU-15 countries have been quoted as 
respondents, as complaints against the EC. 
 
Second, as will be discussed below, there is a problem with data availability with regard to 
certain countries. For two WTO Members we lack data completely – Chinese Taipei 
(Taiwan), and Liechtenstein – and these are omitted from the study. The latter has not been 
involved in any disputes at all, but the former has been complainant in 8 disputes.  
 
Third, for certain issues we divide the WTO Members into broader groups, working with 
the seven groups listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Country classification 
G2: EC,  US 
EI:  Earlier Industrialized (non-G2 countries traditionally considered as 
industrialized) 
NI: Newly  Industrialized 
HID:  High Income Developing (exclusive of NIs), with GDP/cap > $4 000 according 
to UNCTAD 
MID:  Medium Income Developing, with $800< GDP/cap < $4 000 according to 
UNCTAD 
LID:  Low Income Developing (excluding. LDCs), with GDP/cap < $800 according 
to UNCTAD 
CT:  Centrally planned or in Transition 
LDC:  50 countries according to UN classification 
 
The criteria mentioned in Table 1 are to be seen as indicative. The exact classification is 
given in Table 2. The general idea here is to distinguish between groups of countries that 
we believe might differ in a systematic fashion from each other, with regard to their 
incentives to initiate disputes. Most of the distinctions are hopefully fairly obvious, though 
like all classifications they can also be seen as somewhat arbitrary. The distinction between 
Newly Industrialized and High Income Developing countries is made to capture the    18
Table 2: Country classification 
 
 
G2    NI   HID    CT 
EC   Argentina   Antigua  and  Barbuda  Albania 
US    Hong Kong - China  Bahrain    Bulgaria 
    Israel   Barbados    China 
EI   Korea   Brazil   Croatia 
Australia   Malaysia   Brunei Darussalam  Czech Republic 
Canada   Mexico   Chile   Estonia 
Iceland   Philippines  Cyprus    Georgia 
Japan   Singapore   Gabon   Hungary 
Malta   South  Africa  Kuwait    Kyrgyz  Rep 
New Zealand  Thailand    Macao - China  Latvia 
Norway   Turkey   Oman   Lithuania 
Switzerland   Qatar   Moldova 
  MID   Saint Kitts and Nevis  Mongolia 
LDC   Belize   Saudi  Arabia  Poland 
Angola   Bolivia   Trinidad  and  Tobago  Romania 
Bangladesh  Botswana    United Arab Emirates  Slovak Republic 
Benin   Colombia   Uruguay   Slovenia 
Burundi   Congo      
Cambodia   Costa  Rica  LID    
Central African Rep  Cuba    Armenia     
Chad   Dominica   Burkina  Faso   
Dem. Rep. Congo  Dominican Republic  Cameroon    
Djibouti   Ecuador   Côte  d'Ivoire   
Gambia   Egypt   Ghana    
Guinea   El  Salvador  Guyana    
Guinea-Bissau Fiji    Honduras     
Haiti   FYROM-Macedonia  India    
Lesotho   Grenada   Kenya    
Madagascar Guatemala  Nicaragua    
Malawi   Indonesia   Nigeria    
Maldives   Jamaica   Pakistan    
Mali   Jordan   Sri  Lanka    
Mauritania Mauritius    Tanzania     
Mozambique Morocco    Zimbabwe    
Myanmar   Namibia      
Nepal   Panama      
Niger   Papua  New  Guinea       
Rwanda   Paraguay      
Senegal   Peru      
Sierra Leone  Saint Lucia       
Solomon Islands  Saint Vincent & the Grenadines     
Togo   Suriname      
Uganda   Swaziland      
Zambia   Tunisia      
  Venezuela     
   19
significant difference in e.g. technical sophistication of the industries of countries in the 
respective groups. 
 
4.2  Trade, aid, and income data 
With regard to the explanatory variables, in order to reduce the influence of missing values 
and of various stochastic shocks, we compute for each variable except for the dispute 
variable, a yearly average for the years 1998-2002 as long as data so permits. For the few 
instances where data have only been available for a subset of this period, we have 
computed averages for the available period. 
 
Trade data are taken from COMTRADE. They nominally describe bilateral trade flows 
between all WTO Members at the 2-digit HS level. A significant fraction of data are 
missing – for the years 1998-2002 approximately 45% are missing, and we have to make 
adjustments in response to this significant lack of data. First, for some country 
combinations, we only have data for some years. In such cases, we then compute averages 
using whatever data are available for this period. Second, the COMTRADE data set only 
contains non-zero values, so there is of course a strong suspicion that whenever a number is 
missing, that there is no trade.
9 On the other hand, for certain countries, such as Pakistan or 
Taiwan, it is clear that there is trade with a number of countries, despite the fact that no 
trade is reported.  
 
In order to account for these problems, we assume, first, that whenever a value is reported 
for total imports for a country j from a country i (in which case also a HS number is always 
reported), that for those HS 2-digit industries for which no imports are reported, imports are 
zero. The sum of all HS 2-digit imports equals in such cases total imports, due to the 
existence of a unspecified category HS 99. Second, in cases where there is no information 
at all concerning the imports from i to j, we omit the observation of this bilateral trade 




                                                 
9 See Francois and Manchin (2007) on missing trade flows. 
10 To clarify, if imports by country j from country i are excluded, this is done for all HS categories. But such 
an exclusion does not mean that i cannot be recorded to import from j, nor does it affect i’s or j’s imports 
from other countries. 
11 The loss of data due to the lack of HS specification is relatively small, and in no instance exceeds 8% of 
total trade reported trade.   20
With 132 WTO Members in the data set there are 132 x 131 = 17,292 different bilateral 
pairs of import relations. With 15 different groups of industries, the total number of 
distinguishable bilateral import relations is 15 x 17 292 = 259,380. This is the number of 
records that our data set would include, if it were complete (excluding the two countries for 
which there are no data at all). However, due to the missing information, and the 
procedures described above meant to tackle this lacunae of information, the total number of 
records in our data set is 192,720.  
 
Table A-1 in the Annex provides more detailed information on our data for trade structure, 
showing how each country’s trade is distributed across our 15 industry groups. 
 
Data on bilateral aid flows are taken from the OECD data base DAC Online, under the 




Finally, data on GDP at constant 1990 US dollars are taken from the UN Statistics 
Division
13, and these numbers are converted into constant 2005 $US. 
 
4.3 Legal capacity 
It is very common in studies such as the present one to include some measure of legal 
capacity. Unfortunately, there are no direct measures of legal capacity, so instead some 
form of proxy variable has to be used. Before presenting the proxy employed here, let us 
make a couple of more general comments.  
 
First, the literature has often used national per capita income as a proxy for legal capacity. 
This is natural, but problematic. For instance, certain countries have a highly educated elite, 
with excellent knowledge of WTO law, while at the same time having very low per capita 
income. India is an obvious example.  
 
Second, another common proxy is the size of countries’ WTO delegations in Geneva. This 
measure is employed e,g, by Horn et al (1999). There are problems with this proxy for legal 
capacity as well. For instance, while WTO delegates can be seen as experts on WTO issues, 
                                                 
12 The data also contains some negative numbers, indicating repayment of earlier received, but unused, aid. 
13 Data is available at http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/snaama.   21
they are typically not experts on legal matters concerning the WTO. In addition, the 
direction of causality, to the extent there is a correlation, is not clear. It may well be that 
countries have large delegations partly in order to handle the many disputes they invoke. 
That is, size of delegations is not necessarily exogenous to the number of complaints. We 
therefore believe that the size of Geneva delegations is a problematic measure of legal 
capacity. Instead we will use other measures that are more exogenous to the issue at stake 
here.  These are discussed below. 
 
Third, it should also be noted that in general, when using proxies for legal capacity that 
essentially measure the quality of the legal capacity, and not its available quantity, as an 
explanatory variable, it is important to take proper account of the dimensionality of the 
model. For instance, in our specification (as in most other similar attempts in the literature), 
we seek to explain the absolute number of disputes pursued between any pair of countries i 
and j, by (among other things) legal capacity variables ( i L ) and ( j L ). These latter variables 
should hence measure the absolute amount of legal capacity of the exporting and the 
importing country, respectively. Amorphous as this notion of legal capacity is, it seems 
plausible to be larger, all else given, the larger is the population and the higher is its level of 
education. Assuming that the level of education is proportional to national income per 
capita (denoted  i YCAP ), the following would be a simple specification to capture this 
relationship:  i i i YCAP POP L ⋅ = . But, since YCAPi = Yi /POPi, the aggregate amount of legal 








POP L = ⋅ = . 
 
That is, we should under this reasoning not use income per capita, but total income, as a 
proxy of the absolute amount of legal capacity of a country. 
 
In this study we will use a proxy for the quality of legal capacity. The World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Dataset provides several such indices, as for 
instance those for Government Efficiency, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law.
 14 It seems 
likely that the general quality of the legal system, which of course could be measured in a 
                                                 
14 Available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata.   22
large number of ways, is positively correlated with each of these measures. The data are 
provided for the years 1998, 2000 and 2002, and we calculate simple averages of these 
three years for each Member.  Not surprisingly, the three World Bank indices are highly 
correlated (the correlations are larger than .8). We have chosen to use the Government 
Efficiency index. In order to take account of the above-mentioned problem that this index 
does not measure the total amount of legal capacity, but its quality, we multiply the index 




The World Bank index provides numbers for the individual Members of the EU. In order to 
form an index value for the EC, we have weighted each country’s value with the country’s 
share of EU-15 GDP, for each year.  
 
The resulting legal capacity index is provided in the Annex in Table A-2, in the column 
“Own legal capacity”. 
 
4.4  Dispute data 
Dispute data are taken from the Horn and Mavroidis WTO Dispute Settlement Data Set, 
originally compiled in a World Bank project.
17 This data set has recently been updated to 
include all 351 WTO disputes – what we will denote “DS disputes” – initiated through the 
filing of a Request for Consultations at the WTO, from 1 January 1995 until December 31, 
2006, and for these disputes it includes events occurring until this date.
 The data set covers 
exhaustively all stages of dispute settlement proceedings, from when consultations are 
being requested to the eventual implementation of the rulings. The data set contains several 
hundred variables, providing information on various aspects of the legal procedure. From 
this data set we will take information on the identity of the complainants and the 
respondents, and the Harmonized System classification of the products concerned.  
 
                                                 
15 It could be though that the inclusion of the log of GDP both in this index, and directly, will produce 
problems of multicollinearity in the econometric analyses to follow. However, as will be seen, this is not 
actually a problem.  
16 More precisely, the index is constructed such that it takes both positive and negative values (the average 
index calculated for the three years 1998, 2000 and 2002 vary between approx -1.83 and 2.5). It is 
transformed as follows: 
 
)) min ( abs ( ) ln( k k i i i GovEff GovEff Y L
∀ + ⋅ =  
17 The data are available at the www.worldbank.org/trade. However, at the time of writing, the World Bank 
website does still not have the most recent version of this data set, which is what has been used for this study.    23
We transform the data in several ways. First, the conceptual framework to be used in this 
study concerns import measures. We therefore want to omit from the data set all disputes 
concerning export measures. From an economic point of view, it is difficult to determine 
whether a measure amounts to export promotion only, or also restrict imports, due to the 
interrelationship between markets. For instance, a measure that at the face of it appears as 
only enhancing exports, may in practice act as an import restriction in other markets. There 
is therefore a considerable degree of arbitrariness in the decision concerning which DS 
disputes to omit from the data. We have chosen to omit those DS disputes where the matter 
stated in the consultation request mentions export subsidization, leaving 333 DS disputes in 
the data set.
18 This procedure eliminates approximately 5% of the DS data. 
 
Second, we want to define industry-specific disputes. The data set we draw on provides the 
HS number(s) that were mentioned in the Requests for Consultations. These data vary 
greatly in the number of products being mentioned and the HS level. For some disputes 
there is no specification at all of a HS number. This is sometimes due to the fact that the 
contested measure is of such a nature as to not apply to any specific product, but it can also 
reflect the fact that the complaint is not very specific. In contrast, for other disputes a very 
large number of HS numbers are provided, and sometimes at a very detailed level. To 
match our dispute data to trade data, we have to make changes to the data set in order to 
account for the fact that we do not have HS numbers for all disputes: 
 
(i)   We delete all DS disputes for which there is neither a HS number specified, nor a 
product description.  
 
(ii)  For those DS disputes where there is no HS number specified but a verbal product 
description is given, we try as far as possible to use these descriptions to classify the 
industry concerned, as long as they refer to one or several specific (2-digit) industries, and 
                                                 
18 The following DS disputes were omitted on the basis of this criterion: 35, 46, 70, 71, 103, 104, 113, 120, 
127, 128, 129, 130, 155, 194, 222, 265, 266, and 276. The decision to omit export subsidies is admittedly 
arbitrary. For instance, the Brazil-Canada aircraft disputes are omitted from the data due to this, but not the 
Boeing-Airbus disputes. Even though the latter disputes concern imports to a larger extent than the former, 
they still seem fairly similar in nature. However, once we start making more discretionary decisions, we risk 
introducing other forms of bias into the material.   24
not more generic categories, (such as “manufactures”). In cases where both a HS 2-digit 
product is mentioned, and something more generic, we include only the former.
19  
 
(iii) In order to make the statistical analysis more practical, we aggregate the almost 100 
HS 2-digit industries into broader groups of industries. Another reason for aggregating the 
industries is the fact that disputes seem to be HS-classified in very different ways. For 
instance, in textiles disputes many 2-digit industries are mentioned, while this is not as 
common for other products.  There is unfortunately a significant amount of arbitrariness in 
any classification of this sort, while at the same time the the choice of classification may 
have importance for the empirical findings.
 20 We have chosen to identify 15 different 
groups of industries, as listed in Table 3. A more detailed description is provided in Table 
A-3. The basic idea is thus that these groups of industries should be disparate enough so 
that a DS dispute involving two of them can be seen as effectively packaging two separate 
disputes. Our classification largely overlaps with the division in the HS system of the HS 2-
digit industries into “sections”. 
 
Table 3: Grouping of HS 2-digit industries 
 
HS-2 digit numbers  Notation Very broad description 
1-24 Agr  Agricultural  prod. 
25-27, 68-70  Mt1  Materials 1 
28, 29, 31  Ch1  Chemical prod. 1 
30, 33  Pha  Pharmaceuticals 
32, 34-38  Ch2  Chemical prod. 2 
39,40 Pla  Plastics  and  rubber 
41-43, 64, 66, 67  Mt2  Materials 2 
44-48 Woo  Wood  (incl  articles) 
50-63, 65  Txl  Textiles 
72, 73  Stl  Iron and steel 
74-83  Met  Metals other than iron 
84, 85  Mch  Machinery 
86-89 Vhl  Vehicles 
90-96 Man  Misc  manufactures 
49, 71, 97  Oth  Other 
                                                 
19 This eliminates the following DS disputes: 37, 45, 80, 82, 83, 115, 117, 124, 125, 160, 170, 176, 186, 196, 
199, 201, 224, and 285. 
20 For instance, had we used instead a HS 4-digit level, there would have been many more disputes. However, 
it should be recalled that the same method is applied to all disputes, and that what matters to us is the relative 
distribution of the number of disputes.   25
This procedure implies that there are 319 “industry-specific bilateral disputes” (ISBD) in 
our data, each of which concerning one complaining country, one responding country, and 
one of the 15 groups of industries. Table A-4 lists the DS disputes from which these are 
formed and Table A-5 gives the complainants, and the industry groups involved. 
 
Finally, Table 4 contains summary statistics for the variables in the data set. 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics 
 
  Obs Mean  Std  dev  Min Max 
Disputes (i,j,g)  192720  0.00 0.06 7.00  12.00 
Legal cap exporter  192720  45.89 23.91  0.00 109.74 
Legal cap importer  192720  48.27 22.88 12.11  109.74 
ln(GDP exporter)  192720 23.61  2.21  19.25  30.01 
ln(GDP importer)  192720 23.71  2.20  19.51  30.01 
Aid dependence  192720 0.02  0.25  -0.20 10.68 
ln(Agr)  192720 0.61  2.79  0  23.38 
ln(Ch1)  192720 0.35  2.09  0  23.68 
ln(Ch2  192720 0.36  2.05  0  22.54 
ln(Man)  192720 0.45  2.27  0  23.96 
ln(Mch)  192720 0.57  2.65  0  25.01 
ln(Met)  192720 0.38  2.11  0  22.81 
ln(Mt1)  192720 0.45  2.38  0  24.07 
ln(Mt2)  192720 0.34  1.94  0  23.42 
ln(Oth)  192720 0.33  1.90  0  23.11 
ln(Pha)  192720 0.35  2.00  0  23.20 
ln(Pla)  192720 0.43  2.26  0  23.04 
ln(Stl)  192720 0.39  2.15  0  22.45 
ln(Txl)  192720 0.52  2.49  0  23.69 
ln(Vhl)  192720 0.39  2.16  0  24.80 
ln(Woo)  192720 0.41  2.18  0  23.85 
exposure  192720 10.04  2.81  1.06  12.00 
 
 
5.  General patterns in the data 
Given our data, we start with an overview of patterns in the distribution of disputes.  This 
highlights that, as in the older data on which the earlier literature is based, we also observe 
a high correlation between indicators of size, development, export volumes, and 
participation in the DS process.  A natural first step when approaching the question of the 
determinants of dispute initiation is to look at the extent to which it varies with certain   26
factors that it intuitively is likely to be influence by.  We therefore start by looking at what 
is to be explained – the pattern of dispute initiation. 
 
We first plot in Figure 1 each country’s share of all WTO Members’ exports against the 
number of ISBD disputes the country has been involved in. As can be expected, and 
repeatedly pointed out in the literature, there is indeed a very strong positive correlation 
between the two. Figure 2 demonstrates another well-known relationship, by plotting the 
(log of) national income against the number of complaints. Clearly, larger countries initiate 
more disputes. 
 
Figure 1: For each WTO Member, Member’s share of total exports against the 
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Figure 2: For each WTO Member, the logarithm of GDP against the number of 
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Figure 3 highlights the relationship between the legal capacity of each country and the 
number of ISBDs it has been involved in. Again, an expected pattern emerges, whereby 
countries with greater legal capacities are involved as complainants in more disputes.  
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Figure 3: For each WTO Member, the Member’s legal capacity against the number of 

























The relationship between aid flows and dispute initiation is summarized in Figure 4. It plots 
for each country i the aid received by i from all other WTO Members as a fraction of i’s 
income, against the country’s no of ISBDs. As can be seen, there is clearly a very strong 
negative correlation between the two entities: countries for which aid constitute a large 
fraction of national income typically initiate few or no disputes.  (Note that this correlation 
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Figure 4: For each WTO Member, the Member’s net receipt of aid from other WTO 
Members as a fraction of Members GDP against the number of industry-specific 
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Let us next turn to the relationship between export structure, in the sense of the industries in 
which countries trade, and dispute initiation. It is natural to believe that certain industries 
are more likely to feature disputes than others, for instance because more concentrated 
industrial structures encourage more lobbying by industry. There are therefore reasons to 
believe that the difference between developed and developing countries in trade structure 
can explain at least part of the difference in dispute initiation across the two groups. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 highlight the correlation between the export share of developing countries 
for the various HS 2-digit industries, and dispute initiation, in two slightly different ways. 
Figure 5 plots for each HS 2-digit industry, the developing country share of total exports in 
the industry on the horizontal axis, against these countries’ share of the disputes involving 
this industry. The plot thus illustrates whether the industries in which developing countries 
have a large export share are those where they also have a large share of the disputes. There 
is (at least seemingly) not a very strong relationship between the two. 
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Figure 5: For each HS 2-digit industry, developing country share of total exports in 
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Figure 6 looks at the issue from a slightly different perspective. The horizontal axis is as in 
the previous figure, but now the share of exports for developing countries in each industry, 
is plotted against this industry’s share of all disputes. This figure could thus be indicative of 
a situation where developing countries, relative to developed countries, export in industries 
where there is relatively little litigation. No such relationship can be discerned through this 
plot however. Hence, a superficial glance at the data suggests that any problem with 
developing country under-representation as complainants does not seem to be related to 
their export pattern across industries.   
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Figure 6: For each HS 2-digit industry, developing country share of total exports in 
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To conclude, it appears from the figures above as if dispute initiation is strongly positively 
correlated with trade values and with the size of GDP. It is also positively related to our 
measure of legal capacity, and negatively related to our measure capturing power 
considerations (aid dependence). But dispute initiation seems to vary less systematically 
with trade structure. We cannot stop the analysis here, however, for a number of reasons. 
First, the figures above say nothing about the direction of causality. Second, the lack of 
correlation between dispute initiation and trade structure does not necessarily imply that 
these are not interrelated when controlling for other factors. Third, even if dispute initiation 
is caused by the factors we have highlighted, the figures are not very informative with 
regard to the relative strength of the various factors. Furthermore, many of the factors we 
use to explain dispute initiation are just reflections of the same underlying factor, and they 
can all be said to reflect underdevelopment one way or the other. It would be clearly be 
desirable to disentangle the impact of the various factors, and to determine the relationship 
between them. To this end, we have to turn to econometric analysis.  
 
 
6. Econometric  analysis   32
An econometric analysis of the determinants of dispute initiation requires at least three 
components: 
 
(i)   a hypothesis – or theory – for the determinants of dispute initiation;   
(ii)  a set of data on the variables of relevance; and  
(iii) a statistical method for examining the extent to which the data supports the hypothesis. 
 
We have already specified component (i)  – for a working hypothesis, we rely on the 
conceptual framework spelled out in Section 3 – and (ii) – the data needed to analyze this 
framework were described in Section 4. As we have seen, there are potentially serious 
conceptual problems involved in any the specification of the theory in this area, and in the 
construction of the variables to be used when testing.  
 
We now turn to component (iii). As will be argued, it will be highly important to choose a 
statistical method that suits the peculiar features of the data at hand. There are here two 
broad types of purposes that the analysis may seek to fulfill. One purpose of the analysis is 
that it should be analytical, explaining relationships of interest. The aim is then to find 
causal, or at least significant, relations. The main requirement on the model is to include all 
relevant variables, and the explanatory variables have to be exogenous. The other purpose 
is descriptive, often with the hope of making prediction. The main requirement on the 
model is then that it has a good ability to predict. The present study can be said to combine 
elements of both these approaches, by emphasizing the desirability of estimating significant 
relationships, at the same time as using the model for predictions. 
 
6.1  The choice of statistical model 
A natural starting point when seeking to disentangle the relative influence of different 
factors is to use multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. The basic 
version of the OLS model posits a linear relationship between the dependent and the 
explanatory variables. However, a fundamental feature of dispute initiation data is that it is 
“count data” – it takes on only non-negative integer values (0, 1, 2… etc.). In addition, 
there is a heavy dominance of zeros for the ISBD variables: for the 192,720 observations 
we have in the data, there are disputes observed in only approximately 0.1% of the 
instances. Hence, roughly 99.9% of the variable to be explained consists of zeros. As a   33
result, when using the linear OLS model, the errors will not be normally distributed, and 
the model is consequently unsuitable.  
 
Note that the dominance by zeros in the data set is not special to our data set, but is simply 
a reflection of the small number of disputes in the DS system relative to the number of 
potential complainant/respondent pairs. Even if one abstained from disaggregating disputes 
according to industry group, there would still be a heavy dominance by zeros. As can be 
seen, it requires special methods for the few disputes that are in the data set, not to “drown” 
in all the zeros in the estimations. 
 
A very common attempted remedy to the problems caused by the skewed distribution of the 
dependent variable, which is a characteristic of count data, is to let the dependent variable 
(here the number of disputes) enter in logarithmic form, in order to make the distribution of 
the error term closer to the normal distribution. However, this would not suffice in the 
present case. Instead, there is a need to employ a statistical model that is designed to take 
account of the particular features of count data. A natural candidate here, which we will 
also adopt, is the negative binomial regression model. This model is in theory, and 
normally also in practice, much better suited to handle problems arising from count data 
than is the linear OLS model.
21 
22   
 
The negative binomial model we will estimate has the following underlying specification: 
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t is the length of time both i and j have been members, and  g δ  are dummies taking the 
value of one when the industry group concerned is g, and is otherwise equal to zero.  
 
                                                 
21 See e.g. Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for an exposition on econometric methods for count data. 
22 The negative binomial model nests as a special case the Poisson count model. But it is on a priori grounds 
better suited than a standard Poisson model for the situation at hand, both since it is can better handle 
situations with many zeros, and since it can handle problems of over-dispersion (i.e., situations where the 
variance exceeds the conditional mean), both of which are inherent features of our data. Also, if there are 
problems with omitted variables (as in our case), that will translate to a larger error term, in effect resulting in 
over-dispersion. Our estimations will confirm the choice of the negative binomial model over the standard 
Poisson model.    34
At risk of explaining the obvious, let us just say that the point of the estimation is to find 
values of the coefficients  066 2 , 1 , 1 0 ,..., , ,..., , β β β β β Woo Agr  such that the model on the basis of 
the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation, predict dispute initiation 
across triples of (exporter, importer, industry group) as closely as possible to actual dispute 
initiation (the variable on the left-hand side). Having determined these coefficients, and 
assuming we trust the values thus calculated, we would from the magnitude of these values 
know the influence of each of the explanatory variables. 
 
6.2   The estimated model 
Table 5 gives the results of the estimation of the negative binomial regression model.  
 
Table 5: Estimation of the negative binomial regression model 
 
Number of 
observations  192720   Log pseudolikelihood =  -994.264
Dispersion =   mean   Prob  > chi2 =    0
Wald chi2(20) =  1220.14          
(Robust standard errors, adjusted for 132 clusters in comp)     
Dependent variable: No of ISBD   exposure  (exposure)   
            
  Coef. 
Std. 
Err.  z P>|z|  [95%  Conf.  Int.] 
Legal cap exporter  -0.01 0.00  -1.45 0.15  -0.01 0.00 
Legal cap importer  -0.02 0.00  -4.66 0.00  -0.03  -0.01 
ln(GDP exporter)  0.29 0.06  4.74 0.00  0.17 0.42 
ln(GDP importer)  0.55 0.07  8.06 0.00  0.41 0.68 
Aid dependence  -3.28 1.21  -2.71 0.01  -5.66  -0.90 
ln(Agr)  0.60 0.05 12.38  0.00  0.51 0.70 
ln(Ch1)  0.49 0.05  8.83 0.00  0.38 0.59 
ln(Ch2)  0.48 0.06  8.71 0.00  0.38 0.59 
ln(Man)  0.40 0.06  6.69 0.00  0.28 0.52 
ln(Mch)  0.48 0.05 10.41  0.00  0.39 0.57 
ln(Met)  0.42 0.06  6.63 0.00  0.30 0.54 
ln(Mt1)  0.47 0.05  9.44 0.00  0.38 0.57 
ln(Mt2)  0.53 0.05 11.26  0.00  0.44 0.62 
ln(Oth)  0.46 0.06  8.29 0.00  0.35 0.57 
ln(Pha)  0.52 0.05  9.53 0.00  0.41 0.63 
ln(Pla)  0.46 0.06  8.06 0.00  0.35 0.57 
ln(Stl)  0.55 0.05 10.72  0.00  0.45 0.65 
ln(Txl)  0.52 0.05 10.60  0.00  0.43 0.62 
ln(Vhl)  0.53 0.05 10.67  0.00  0.43 0.63   35
ln(Woo)  0.51 0.05  9.35 0.00  0.40 0.62 
_cons  -36.80 2.33  -15.79 0.00  -41.36  -32.23 
exposure  (exposure)         
          
/lnalpha  0.85 0.33     0.21 1.49 
alpha  2.34 0.76     1.24 4.43 
 
 
Let us first note that the legal capacity of the exporter is the only coefficient that is 
insignificant – all other parameters are significant at the 1% level (or better). The 
coefficient for legal capacity of the importing country is significant however, and negative 
as the theory predicted: higher-capacity importers tend to face fewer disputes. This part of 
the “legal capacity hypothesis” discussed in Section 2 is thus confirmed. 
 
As always in these instances, it is hard without much further examination to determine the 
reason why the legal capacity of the exporting country is insignificant.
23 But a natural 
possibility is of course that the proxy does not perform very well with regard to capturing 
relevant aspects of legal capacity. Note, however, that the exporter’s legal capacity is 
positively correlated with dispute initiation, as illustrated in Figure 3. An alternative 
explanation for the lack of significance is that legal capacity is defined through GDP, and 
thereby highly correlated with the latter. The expected effect of this multicollinearity is 
precisely that of reducing significance levels. However, even with the GDP variable 
omitted, exporter’s legal capacity is still not significant. Note further that this 
multicollinearity problem notwithstanding, the importer’s GDP and legal capacity are both 
significant with opposite signs. 
 
There is indeed a seemingly widespread view in the literature that the measures for legal 
capacity that are available are all rather poor indicators. Hopefully, the survey work that 
Busch, Reinhardt and Shaffer (2007) has recently been conducting will provide researchers 
with better information on the exact nature of developing country lack of legal capacity in 
the WTO system. 
                                                 
23 In contrast, this variable tends to be more significant in the OLS regressions. We can also note that in the 
present estimation, it also takes on the wrong sign, suggesting that more legal capacity should reduce the 
expected number of disputes. The latter may at first seem highly counterintuitive. But a possible interpretation 
of such relationship would be that countries with significant legal capacity deter trading partners from 
committing illegalities, and therefore face fewer illegalities than countries with less legal capacity. We are for 
several reasons not convinced about the validity of this argument, however.   36
 
Before turning to the other variables, let us just mention that because of the non-linear 
nature of count models such as this one, the interpretation of the coefficients is a bit more 
complicated than in the case of e.g. standard OLS, and these matters are further 
complicated by the fact that our explanatory variables sometimes are in log form. In the 
case where the explanatory variable appears in log form, the interpretation is simply that of 
an elasticity: a coefficient value of k for the explanatory variable x implies that a one 
percent change in x changes the number of ISBDs by k percent. 
 
With regard to the other explanatory factors examined in the estimation, the theory predicts 
that exporters with higher GDP tend to initiate more disputes, since higher GDP tends to 
make enforcement easier, which in turn should tend to increase the expected benefit from 
pursuing a dispute. The estimated model confirms this hypothesis.  Note however that this 
is not simply capturing a size of exports effect, since exports and its decomposition, enter 
separately in the regression. 
 
But the size of the importer’s GDP also positively affects dispute initiation, contradicting 
the idea that enforcement is made more difficult by a larger respondent. The latter can 
plausibly be explained by a weakness in our theory above. It could be argued that larger 
respondents on average have larger latent import demand, and that all else given, the 
expected gain from complaining against such a country therefore is larger. A larger market 
is also likely to be the target of other countries’ complaints. This makes it more likely to be 
the subject of complaints by other countries, in which case it would be easier jointly file a 
Request for Consultations. It can be noted that importing country GDP not only enters with 
the wrong sign, but also that the effect is important quantitatively speaking: the positive 
impact of importing country GDP on expected dispute initiation is in absolute terms larger 
than the impact of exporting country GDP. These results, taken together with the 
significantly negative impact of the importer’s legal capacity on dispute initiation, are in 
line with the findings by Guzman and Simmons (2005) that legal capacity seems to be more 
important for the choice of respondent than “power considerations”.  
 
The coefficient for the variable capturing the bilateral aid dependence of the exporter is 
negative, as theory predicts. The regression thus prima facie seem to confirm that aid   37
dependence may be a disciplining factor on dispute initiation, as discussed above.
24 
However, this effect seems implausibly large, most likely due to an endogeneity problem 
inherent in our econometric model – aid dependence will in effect serve as a general proxy 
for underdevelopment and may therefore capture various factors influencing the propensity 
to initiate disputes. In particular, high aid dependence is likely to be correlated to 
preferential tariff treatment by richer countries. Consequently, the significant coefficient for 
aid dependence has two interpretations: it may signal the existence of power politics – 
donor countries bully the recipient countries not to react on illegalities – or it may signal 
absence of illegalities correlated to aid dependence, due to preferential treatment. The 
estimated coefficient will capture both of these effects. It should be noted that this 
endogeneity problem is not particular to our model, but is inherent in any model that does 
not control for preferential treatment (including, for example, Zejan and Bartels (2006)). In 
addition, since the absolute majority of the observation for disputes and aid are zero, the 
small existing variation in these variables will make the results sensitive to outliers and 
omitted variables. 
 
Let us now turn to trade structure. We first note that all the coefficients enter with the 
expected positive sign. Hence, for each industry, holding the level of exports in other 
industries constant, more exports are likely to be associated with more dispute initiation. 
But we can also see that industries differ in the extent to which trade volumes can be 
expected to increase dispute initiation. The grouping “Agr” stands out as the industry group 
with the highest propensity, and it can be shown that the coefficient is significantly larger 
than the other coefficients.
25 The industry group with the lowest propensity is “Man,” 
where a certain proportional increase in the trade volume is likely to generate two-thirds as 
many more disputes compared to Agr. We thus conclude that countries’ structure of trade 
across sectors actually is likely to affect their propensity to initiate disputes. We will return 
                                                 
24 As a side remark, if we instead of complainants who initiated disputes consider countries that only filed a 
request to join consultations, aid dependence is not significant. Hence, the deterrent effect of aid dependence 
only has a bite for countries that participate in the original Request for Consultations.  
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where the second term now measures the divergence from the base case (which is taken to be Agr) for the 
dispute sensitivity on trade. This formulation is economically and econometrically equivalent to the one 
employed in the paper, but gives test statistics that directly tell whether an industry is significantly different 
from the base case. This will be the case whenever its coefficient  g 1 β  (for g different from Agr) is 
significantly different from zero.    38
to this issue below. 
 





6.3  Model predictions concerning participation in the DS system 
Having broadly presented the role of the various explanatory factors as suggested by the 
estimated model, we will now use the model to predict several aspects of participation.  
 
6.3.1 Which countries does the model suggest as being over/under-represented as 
complainants? 
The purpose of the estimation is to determine the set of coefficient values for the different 
explanatory factors that makes the model predict as closely as possible the actual numbers. 
In this exercise we are constrained by the mathematical properties that are imposed by the 
statistical model. The estimation thus determines the set of parameter values that would 
most likely give rise to the observed data, given the mathematical structure imposed by the 
statistical model (the negative binomial model, etc.).  
 
In a certain sense, the coefficients can be said to represent the “average” impact of each 
explanatory factor. That is, they are not determined so as to completely predict a particular 
observation, such as the impact of Chile’s exports in industry group Agr to the US on the 
expected number of dispute initiations by Chile against the US in this industry group Agr. 
Instead, the estimated coefficient for Agr will reflect the impact across all bilateral country 
pairs involving exports of Agr. We can therefore use the difference between the actual 
number of ISBDs and the predicted number of such disputes for different countries, and in 
particular country groups, as an indication of whether the country or country group is 
“under-represented” or “over-represented” with regard to dispute initiation, relative to this 
“conditional average.”  
 
                                                 
26 As suggested by Pregibon (1980), a model specification test can be done by running a negative binomial 
regression of the actual ISBD variable on fitted values and squared fitted values. If the latter are significantly 
different from zero there are indications of a specification error. In this case the p-value is 0.38, indicating no 
model specification error. There are reasons to believe however, that there are omitted variables.  
27 As mentioned, the Poisson model is a simpler version of the model employed here, but cannot handle 
situations with over-dispersion. Indeed, the estimated dispersion parameter is significantly positive (see Table 
5), confirming the decision not to use the Poisson model.   39
Table 6 gives the actual ISBD for each country, and the number that is predicted according 
to the negative binomial model. As the Table shows, the model performs well in the 
aggregate in that it predicts only six more disputes than what the data set actually contains. 
The Table suggests that among the group of “overrepresented” countries are Canada, the 
EC, Hungary, and the group of Latin-American countries including Chile, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, and Panama. At the other end of the spectrum are Australia, China, 
Japan, Malaysia, South Africa, and Thailand, all of which initiate fewer ISBDs than the 
average country would given the characteristics of their situation. The US is neither over- 
or underrepresented here. 
   40
Table 6: Actual and predicted number of IBSD by country according to the negative 
binomial model 
 
Country Act. Pred.  Diff    Country Act. Pred. Diff Country Act. Pred. Diff
Albania 0 0.0  0.0    Gabon  0 0.1 -0.1   New  Zealand  4 2.9 1.1
Angola 0 0.1  -0.1    Gambia  0 0.0 0.0   Nicaragua  1 0.1 0.9
Antigua & Barb.  0 0.0  0.0    Georgia  0 0.0 0.0   Niger  0 0.0 0.0
Argentina 9 8.6  0.4    Ghana  0 0.1 -0.1   Nigeria  0 1.0 -1.0
Armenia 0 0.0  0.0    Grenada  0 0.0 0.0   Norway  4 3.9 0.1
Australia 2 8.5  -6.5    Guatemala 5 0.7 4.3   Oman  0 0.2 -0.2
Bahrain 0 0.2  -0.2    Guinea  0 0.0 0.0   Pakistan 3 1.4 1.6
Bangladesh 1 0.7  0.3    Guinea-Bissau  0 0.0 0.0   Panama  3 0.5 2.5
Barbados  0 0.1  -0.1    Guyana  0 0.0 0.0   Pap. New Guinea  0 0.1 -0.1
Belize 0 0.1  -0.1    Haiti  0 0.0 0.0   Paraguay  0 0.4 -0.4
Benin 0 0.0  0.0    Honduras  5 0.2 4.8   Peru  2 1.4 0.6
Bolivia  0 0.2  -0.2    Hong Kong – Ch.  1 3.2 -2.2   Philippines  4 2.3 1.7
Botswana 0 0.1  -0.1    Hungary  5 1.2 3.8   Poland  3 2.0 1.0
Brazil 16 15.2  0.8    Iceland  0 0.6 -0.6   Qatar  0 0.2 -0.2
Brunei Daruss.  0 0.1  -0.1    India  16 9.1 6.9   Romania  0 0.7 -0.7
Bulgaria 0 0.7  -0.7    Indonesia 2 6.3 -4.3   Rwanda  0 0.0 0.0
Burkina Faso  0 0.0  0.0    Israel  0 1.9 -1.9   St Kitts & Nevis  0 0.0 0.0
Burundi 0 0.0  0.0    Jamaica  0 0.4 -0.4   Saint  Lucia  0 0.0 0.0
Cambodia 0 0.0  0.0    Japan  9 23.9 -14.9   St Vinc. & Gren.  0 0.0 0.0
Cameroon 0 0.2  -0.2    Jordan  0 0.1 -0.1   Saudi  Arabia  0 0.2 -0.2
Canada 21 16.2  4.8    Kenya  0 0.3 -0.3   Senegal  0 0.1 -0.1
Central Afr. Rep  0 0.0  0.0    Korea  13 10.9 2.1   Sierra Leone  0 0.0 0.0
Chad 0 0.0  0.0    Kuwait  0 0.4 -0.4   Singapore  1 2.7 -1.7
Chile  8 3.4  4.6    Kyrgyz Republic  0 0.0 0.0   Slovak Republic  0 0.4 -0.4
China 2 11.0  -9.0    Latvia  0 0.1 -0.1   Slovenia  0 0.4 -0.4
Colombia 3 2.6  0.4    Lesotho  0 0.0 0.0   Solomon  Islands  0 0.0 0.0
Congo 0 0.1  -0.1    Lithuania  0 0.1 -0.1   South  Africa  0 4.0 -4.0
Costa Rica  3 1.6  1.4    Macao - China  0 0.2 -0.2   Sri Lanka  1 0.7 0.3
Croatia 0 0.2  -0.2    Madagascar  0 0.1 -0.1   Suriname  0 0.0 0.0
Cuba 0 0.5  -0.5    Malawi  0 0.1 -0.1   Swaziland  0 0.1 -0.1
Cyprus 0 0.1  -0.1    Malaysia  1 4.6 -3.6   Switzerland  4 4.9 -0.9
Czech Republic  1 1.1  -0.1    Maldives  0 0.0 0.0   Tanzania  0 0.2 -0.2
Côte d'Ivoire  0 0.6  -0.6    Mali  0 0.0 0.0   Thailand  9 6.2 2.8
DR Congo  0 0.0  0.0    Malta  0 0.2 -0.2   Togo  0 0.0 0.0
Djibouti  0 0.0  0.0    Mauritania  0 0.0 0.0   Trinidad and Tob.  0 0.3 -0.3
Dominica 0 0.0  0.0    Mauritius  0 0.2 -0.2   Tunisia  0 0.2 -0.2
Dominican Rep.  0 0.7  -0.7    Mexico  14 11.1 2.9   Turkey  2 4.5 -2.5
EC 74 61.8  12.2    Moldova  0 0.0 0.0   US  62 63.1 -1.1
Ecuador 3 1.1  1.9    Mongolia 0 0.0 0.0   Uganda  0 0.1 -0.1
Egypt 0 0.9  -0.9    Morocco  0 0.7 -0.7   Un.  Arab  Emir.  0 1.2 -1.2
El Salvador  0 0.3  -0.3    Mozambique 0 0.1 -0.1   Uruguay  1 1.0 0.0
Estonia 0 0.1  -0.1    Myanmar  0 0.5 -0.5   Venezuela  1 2.1 -1.1
FYROM-Mac. 0 0.0  0.0    Namibia  0 0.1 -0.1   Zambia  0 0.0 0.0
Fiji 0 0.2  -0.2    Nepal  0 0.0 0.0   Zimbabwe  0 0.4 -0.4
 
For better overview, Table 7 aggregates the figures in Table 6 over each of the seven 
country groups we defined in the above:   41
 
Table 7: Actual and predicted number of IBSD according to negative binomial model 
 
Country group  Actual ISBD  Pred. ISBD  Diff 
G2  136 125 11 
EI 44  61  -17 
NI 54  60  -6 
CT 11  18  -7 
HID  25 23 2 
MID  22 21 1 
LID 26  14  12 
LDC 1  2  -1 
Tot 319  325  -6 
 
 
According to this broader picture, the “over-represented” groups are G2 (specifically, the 
EC), and in proportion to their actual number of ISBDs, in particular the low income 
developing countries. Three groups of countries are less active as complainants than what is 
suggested by the volume and pattern of their trade etc: Early Industrialized countries, 
Countries in Transition, and the Newly Industrialized countries. Again, it should be 
emphasized that “over-“ and “under-representation” are to be seen relative to the estimated 
model, not necessarily to an “objective” benchmark. 
 
A few specific remarks about the LDC group are in order. First, in terms of the absolute 
numbers of disputes, the model does a better job at predicting the actual number of disputes 
for LDCs than for any other group. Second, the predictions also illustrate intrinsic problems 
with the kind of approach taken here, as well as in the rest of the literature, when it comes 
to evaluating the degree of LDC under-representation. The model suggests that LDCs 
should have 100% more disputes than they have had, and this group is in this sense actually 
the most under-represented group among the 7 in the study. However, intuitively it seems 
to be a different matter for a group of countries to increase the number of complaints from 
say 40 to 80, than from 1 to 2. Also, intuition suggests that the very small number of 
disputes involved in the case of LDCs leave much more room for randomness than is the 
case for the other groups, partly since the number of actual disputes has to be an integer 
number. (Had for some reason LDCs had two complaints, their participation would 
suddenly be twice as large.) In particular, a transition from zero disputes to one dispute 
intuitively seems to contain special considerations, due to threshold effects. Our bottom   42
line is that while these kinds of models seem able to fairly accurately predict the broader 
patterns of dispute initiation, they are not suited to determine whether LDCs should on the 
basis of their trade patterns, legal capacity, etc, have say two or three disputes, rather than 
one.  
 
6.3.2  What is the impact of LDC country size on dispute initiation? 
LDCs differ from richer countries in several ways, and each difference may have an impact 
on dispute initiation. A recurring theme in the literature is the question of whether 
developing countries participate less as complainants compared to richer countries because 
of smaller commercial interests, or because of more “structural” factors. The results from 
the negative binomial model indeed suggest that there is more to the issue than just 
aggregate trade volume or aggregate bilateral trade volumes. In particular, it was seen that 
absolute size of the trading economies matters beyond what is captured by trade volumes, 
and second, that trade structure across industry groups also seem to matter. In this and the 
next subsection we use the estimated model to shed further light on these issues. 
 
An important aspect of LDCs is that they simultaneously harbor a number of features that 
alone are each likely to give rise to a low level of dispute initiation: small export volumes, 
small GDP, legally competent trading partners, aid dependence, etc. There is a strong 
suspicion on our part that these factors do not only individually contribute to low levels of 
dispute initiation, but also that they may interact in important ways. Intuitively, the joint 
effect of the weaknesses is larger than what the “sum of the individual weaknesses” would 
suggest. One way of examining this issue would be to answer the following question: 
suppose that all LDCs were merged into an “LDC Union” for the handling of complaints in 
the DS system. The union would be instructed to base its decisions concerning litigation on 
the combined exports of its members, and would draw on the combined resources of the 
countries in other respects. How would this affect the total number of complaints initiated 
by LDCs? Clearly, in order to answer this we cannot simply consider the simple 
correlations that the graphs above represent. We need to understand the interplay between 
the various factors determining dispute initiation. Hence, a relatively simple – but 
erroneous – way of addressing this issue would be to examine the relationship between 
export values and dispute initiation for richer countries. Having established this 
relationship, one could plug in the exports of the LDCs to obtain a certain number of 
disputes, which most likely would be larger than the actual number of disputes for the   43
LDCs. The problem with this method however, is that it does not take into consideration 
the fact that the richer countries not only have different trade patterns, they are also 
different in other respects, such as legal capacity, relative power, etc, aspects that the model 
has shown to matter.  
 
One possible approach to answer the question of what impact the formation of the LDC 
Union would have is to use the estimated model to compute how much trade such a country 
would have. We want to emphasize that our calculations are here only meant to be 
illustrative of the type of analysis that can be performed, with an estimated model of the 
kind we have here. In order to have full confidence in the actual numbers, much more 
detailed work is necessary than we have been able to undertake here. In particular, if there 
are omitted variables that are correlated with the regressors, these are implicitly assumed to 
change as the value of the regressors change. 
 
Should one not expect the LDC Union to simply initiate the same number of disputes as the 
LDC do together in its absence? The answer is no, given the non-linear properties of the 
model. In order to avoid a technical description, let us just say there are forces suggesting 
that the LCD Union would initiate fewer disputes; for instance, with the coefficients for the 
export volumes of the various industry groups smaller than unity, the expected number of 
ISBDs are increasing at a decreasing rate in the volume of any particular industry. Also, 
intra-LDC trade is not accounted for, which reduces total trade values. On the other hand, 
because of the interaction between the different explanatory factors, there are tendencies for 
the opposite. 
 
In order to assess the implication of the formation of the LDC Union we assume more 
specifically the following. The trade flows are for each industry group, the sum over all 
members of the LDC Union, excluding of course trade between the LDCs. The GDP 
influencing its decisions is the sum of the GDP of the individual members. To compute a 
legal capacity index, we first compute a weighted average of the Government Efficiency 
variable, using GDP shares. This index is then transformed to a legal capacity index by 
multiplying the index value with the log of GDP. The aid dependence is the total net aid 
flows to the countries in the LDC Union, set in relation to the total GDP of the group. We 
also adjust for the time the countries have been WTO members. Clearly, this is not the only   44
way in which we could form a LDC Union. However, they seem to us to represent one 
natural experiment. 
 
Having constructed the LDC Union along the lines described above, the next step is to use 
the estimated coefficients from the model to calculate the expected number of disputes it 
would initiate.
28 The prediction thus derived is that this country would initiate 4.3 disputes 
rather than the two disputes that the model predicts that this group of countries would have 
if acting individually. Again, we want to emphasize that one should not put much faith in 
the absolute level of this number. What it may shed light on however, are some more 
qualitative features of dispute initiation, which is that LDCs may have so few disputes not 
only because of small trade volumes, or because of small own GDP, but also because of the 
interaction between such explanatory factors. Loosely put: the fact that simultaneously 
both LDC export volumes and GDP levels (and other factors affecting the number of 
ISBDs) are small is what makes things particularly bad from a dispute initiation point of 
view.  Collectively, the factors that define underdevelopment work together to drive down 
participation in the DS system in a predictable fashion. 
 
6.3.3  What is the impact of the LDC composition of exports on dispute initiation? 
A common perception in the policy literature seems to be the notion that part of the reason 
why developing countries participate less as complainants is that their trade compositions 
differ from those of richer countries. To shed some light on the validity of this claim, we 
use the estimated model to undertake the thought experiment of assuming that the industry 
export shares of the LDC Union formed in the previous subsection, are changed so as to 
replicate export shares of richer countries while maintaining a constant total volume of 
exports. The idea is hence to neutralize for absolute trade volume, and to focus on the effect 
of the industry structure per se. More specifically, we first compute the unweighted average 
of the share of each the industry groups in total exports for across the three groups of richer 
countries G2, EI and NI.
29 We then ask how many disputes the LDC Union would have if 
its total export volume were the same as computed before, but with the richer country 
composition of these exports.  
                                                 
28 This procedure could be criticized on the ground that the coefficients would be different if estimated with 
the LDC Union in place. But we believe that it would not make much difference to the results quantitatively, 
since the LDC are small also in the aggregate relative to the other countries.  
29 An alternative to using an unweighted scheme would be to simply aggregate over the three groups (this 
would in turn of course be equivalent to using total exports as weights when computing the average). This 
would imply that the G2 export structure would dominate the computed shares.   45
 
As it turns out, the trade structure of the LDCs seems to have a very limited impact on their 
dispute initiation. As mentioned above, the LDC Union would be expected to initiate 
approximately 4.3 disputes with the actual trade structure of these countries. Taking the 
further step of changing the structure to that of the developed countries would only increase 
the number of expected disputes to just under five. Hence, it seems as if the composition of 
LDC exports in itself is not a very important factor explaining the limited participation. Of 
course, we should be very careful not to draw far-reaching policy conclusions based on this 
finding. For instance, even if we trusted the number (which we should not do without much 
further verification), we should not jump to the conclusion that the problem of what appears 
to be too low levels of dispute initiation is explained partly or fully by other factors than 
trade structure. It may well be that our very broad industry groups in actuality encompass 
significant intra-group differences. To address this problem, we would need a much more 
refined industry classification. But we have deliberately chosen a fairly coarse industry 
classification, partly for the sake of expositional clarity, and partly in order to aggregate 
away noise in the data. Also, if we were to find that the composition seems to matter we 
would have to determine why this is the case, in order to draw any policy conclusions. For 
instance, this might reflect other differences between developed and developing countries 
that are endogenously captured by the included regressors. 
 
6.4   Other econometric approaches 
Our conclusion from the above is that the negative binomial model seems to be doing a 
fairly good job. Nonetheless, it is likely that it will not be able to fully handle the problems 
caused by the very large number of zeros. There are techniques however, that are meant to 
address the problem with a large number of zeros more directly. A prominent candidate 
here is an extension of the model, the “zero-inflated negative binomial model.”  Applied to 
the present context, an essential feature of this approach is to view the determination of the 
number of dispute initiations as two separate processes. One determines whether a country 
is active at all as a potential complainant, and the second determines the number of disputes 
that the country has over a certain period, given that it decides in the first process to 
potentially participate. A zero-participation for a country can then result either from a 
decision to not participate at all, or from a decision to potentially participate combined with 
a decision not to launch any complaints despite the readiness to do so.   46
 
This view of dispute initiation seems to us to resonate well with the popular notion that 
some countries – in particular LDCs – are not even potentially complainants, but are 
completely outside the system. For instance, it has been forcefully argued by Shaffer (2003) 
that for the reasons discussed above, as well as some additional factors, the poorest WTO 
Members are effectively not active players as potential litigants in the DS system.  They 
have nothing to litigate over. 
 
The zero-inflated negative binomial model regression model thus seems to be pertinent for 
the issue at stake both from a theoretical and from an intuitive point of view. We have spent 
considerable efforts to estimate such models, using the data presented above. But our 
attempts have to not been very successful.
30 We therefore leave this area for future research 
(perhaps in future when we have deeper datasets and better solution methods for these 
models). However, we want to emphasize that the dominance of zeros in the data is a 




7.   Concluding remarks 
There has been an undercurrent of worry around the WTO DS mechanism since its 
inception.  In particular, there has been alleged that the system is biased against developing 
countries, and there have been proposals for reform of the system to remedy such perceived 
biases, particularly in dispute initiation. The starting point of research in this area is 
therefore a seemingly simple question.  “Do developing countries use the DS mechanism 
less than they ‘should’ based on objective criteria?”   
 
                                                 
30 At some instance, the maximum likelihood estimations that are used do not converge. At other instances, 
the models produce absurd predictions. We believe that these features may stem from the fact that the zero-
inflated negative binomial model combines two more primitive models, a count data model, and a probability 
model. Count data models and binary response models (BRM) have different underlying assumptions. When 
combined, as in the zero-inflated negative binomial model, their interaction may have effects on robustness 
that do not seem to have been sufficiently explored in the literature. In particular BRMs makes strong 
assumptions concerning correct specification and marginal effects of the regressors. In cases when 
endogeneity is present, the maximum likelihood estimator performs notoriously bad. (See Hall and Shen 
(2005).) 
31 It should be said that binary response models (probit and logit) to a certain degree solve this problem by 
only reflecting whether or not a dispute has occurred. This is done at the cost of disregarding a significant 
amount of information, however, and the results can therefore be quite misleading.    47
In our empirical analysis, we have tried to highlight aspects of this question, by improving 
on the earlier literature in several respects. First, we use a much richer dispute data set than 
has been used so far in the literature, by including all dispute initiation during the period 
1995-2006. Second, we focus more on the role of industrial structure than has been done in 
the literature. Third, we employ econometric techniques that, while not entirely new in the 
field, are more suitable to the situation at hand than what is often used. Our results suggest 
that the composition of trade, the volume of trade, income levels, aid levels, and legal 
capacity, explain the observed aggregate level of dispute initiation fairly well. Predictions 
from the estimated model also suggest that Low Income Developing countries, as defined 
in Table 1, have launched more complaints than they should have, based on these 
characteristics. 
 
Fourth, we use the estimated model to answer two fundamental questions concerning the 
determinants of Least Developed Country participation as complainants, questions that to 
the best of our knowledge have not been highlighted in the literature. Our first question 
concerns the role of economic country size. It is often said that since LDCs typically are 
very small in terms of GDP, in terms of trade, etc, that they do not have incentives to 
launch disputes. We therefore make the thought-experiment of merging all LDCs into an 
“LDC Union” for the handling of complaints in the DS system. This Union is instructed to 
base its decisions concerning litigation on the combined exports of its members, and would 
draw on the combined resources of the countries in other respects. The model predicts that 
a country with the characteristics of this “LDC Union” would have initiated 4.3 disputes 
rather than the two disputes that the model predicts that this group of countries would have 
launched if acting individually. One should be careful not to over-emphasize the validity of 
these numbers. More interesting is that this experiment suggests that LDCs may have so 
few disputes not only because of small trade volumes, or because of small GDP levels, but 
also because of the interaction between such explanatory factors. 
 
The second issue upon which we seek to shed light is the common perception in the policy 
literature that the LDC trade composition explains their seemingly low participation rates. 
To this end we make the further thought experiment of letting the export structure of this 
“LDC Union” be the same as the average of the exports of G2, Earlier Industrialized and 
Newly Industrialized countries, while keeping the total volume of exports unchanged. This 
“LDC Union” is hence in terms of industry export structure a replica of the richer countries,   48
but is in other respects an aggregation of LDCs. Using the estimated model, this change in 
export composition would increase the number of disputes by roughly 15%. This suggests 
that export composition has a fairly limited impact on the dispute initiation by LDC, 
contrary to what is often suggested.  
 
We would finally like to emphasize the great caution that is needed when drawing policy 
conclusions based on observations concerning dispute initiation in the DS system. Such 
conclusions are inevitably based on a number of special assumptions that are typically not 
made explicit. For instance, there are conceptual problems with regard to the definition of 
the unit of account (“a dispute”) as well as relevant benchmarks, there are econometric 
problems with regard to how to distinguish the determinants of dispute initiation as well as 
how to handle the dominance of zeros in the data, there are data availability problems with 
regard to a number of important variables such as legal capacity and power. In addition, 
there are conceptual problems with regard to how to frame relevant and well-defined 
questions that can be answered within the model. We have here tried to address some of 
these problems, but most still remain.  49
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Table A-1: Total exports in $US mill and the fraction thereof for each industry group 












































































































Albania  311 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.01  0.05 0.31 0.01 0.04
Angola  6020 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ant.and  Barb.  147 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.73 0.00
Argentina  25400 0.48 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.02
Armenia  170 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00  0.04 0.08 0.01 0.01
Australia  57600 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.32 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02
Bahrain  2530 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.27 0.46 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01  0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01
Bangladesh  5890 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00
Barbados  296 0.24 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.04
Belize  293 0.79 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02
Benin  286 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.64 0.00 0.02
Bolivia  1020 0.38 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.33 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
Botswana  1270 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Brazil  54600 0.27 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03  0.07 0.02 0.12 0.08
Brunei  Daruss.  3080 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00
Bulgaria  4380 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.24 0.01 0.03
Burkina  Faso  223 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.51 0.05 0.01
Burundi  56 0.78 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Cambodia  1410 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02  0.00 0.84 0.00 0.04
Cameroon  2020 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.27
Canada  240000 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.26 0.13
Central Afr. Rep  202  0.05  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.16
Chad  102 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.79 0.02 0.00
Chile  17100 0.33 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13
China  368000 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.32 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.03  0.02 0.17 0.01 0.02
Colombia  12900 0.29 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.40 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02
Congo  1760 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.83 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
Costa  Rica  6750 0.39 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.01
Croatia  3040 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.06  0.04 0.19 0.03 0.10
Cuba  978 0.55 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00  0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cyprus  870 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01  0.02 0.09 0.29 0.01
Czech  Republic  28500 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.29 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.05
Côte  d'Ivoire  4220 0.62 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.09
DR  Congo  1180 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.23 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Djibouti  18 0.30 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.01  0.04 0.01 0.08 0.01
Dominica  89 0.31 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.02  0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
Dominican  Rep.  4870 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.51 0.00 0.00
EC  753000 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.31 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.03
Ecuador  5680 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Egypt  5310 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.41 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.04 0.26 0.00 0.00
El  Salvador  2860 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.58 0.01 0.03
Estonia  3590 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.05 0.10 0.03 0.14
FYROM-Mac.  962 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.36 0.04 0.01
Fiji  532 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.05
Gabon  2920 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.18
   52












































































































Gambia  83 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03
Georgia  397 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.46 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.05
Ghana  1500 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.14
Grenada  55 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04
Guatemala  4600 0.42 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.34 0.00 0.02
Guinea  777 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Guinea-Bissau  97 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
Guyana  579 0.47 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.08
Haiti  322 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.79 0.00 0.00
Honduras  3970 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.01 0.02
HK-China  51100 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.01
Hungary  27300 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.49 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.02
Iceland  2170 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00
India  43200 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.25 0.02 0.01
Indonesia  56400 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.27 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.12
Israel  26300 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.33 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00
Jamaica  1580 0.23 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00
Japan  413000 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.48 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.22 0.01
Jordan  1180 0.13 0.31 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.02
Kenya  1770 0.60 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02
Korea  139000 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.46 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.01
Kuwait  13700 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kyrgyz  Rep  197 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.00
Latvia  2730 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.31 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.28
Lesotho  265 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00
Lithuania  3200 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.24 0.02 0.08
Macao - China  2350  0.01  0.01  0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00
Madagascar  869 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.02
Malawi  456 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00
Malaysia  96900 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.64 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04
Maldives  170 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.00
Mali  238 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.74 0.01 0.01
Malta  2170 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.61 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.00
Mauritania  578 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Mauritius  1660 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.01 0.00
Mexico  141000 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.40 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.01
Moldova  385 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.31 0.01 0.00
Mongolia  398 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.42 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.00 0.02
Morocco  7950 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.01
Mozambique  586 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04
Myanmar  2000 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.19
Namibia  770 0.48 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Nepal  632 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.59 0.00 0.02
New  Zealand  13600 0.50 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.13
Nicaragua  976 0.52 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.02
Niger  267 0.05 0.37 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Nigeria  17100 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Norway  47300 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.57 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04
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Oman  7760 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Pakistan  8520 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.00
Panama  2620 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.02
Papua  N  Guinea  1840 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
Paraguay  1170 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.07
Peru  5880 0.30 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.22 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.02
Philippines  37100 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.01
Poland  28500 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.21 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.07
Qatar  9060 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Romania  10600 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.31 0.04 0.05
Rwanda  85 0.38 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
St Kitts and Nevis  64  0.20  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.00
St  Lucia  90 0.62 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.04
St Vinc. & Gren.  193  0.37  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.55 0.01
Saudi  Arabia  60000 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Senegal  700 0.54 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
Sierra  Leone  143 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.02
Singapore  80800 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.66 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Slovak  Republic  11500 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.22 0.06
Slovenia  8230 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.07
Solomon  Islands  134 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45
South  Africa  36200 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.04
Sri  Lanka  4510 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.58 0.01 0.01
Suriname  543 0.19 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Swaziland  391 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.08
Switzerland  88800 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.15 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Tanzania  653 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.01
Thailand  63000 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.41 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02
Togo  302 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.02
Trinidad  and  Tob.  3690 0.08 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02
Tunisia  6100 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.01
Turkey  26200 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.40 0.07 0.01
US  707000 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.39 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.03
Uganda  396 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
United  Arab  Em.  28100 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.74 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Uruguay  2520 0.48 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.05
Venezuela  24500 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00
Zambia  685 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.65 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.00
Zimbabwe  1770 0.51 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.02
 
 
Note: Total trade includes all trade for which an HS 2-digit number has been reported. It is 
computed as an average over 1998-2002, as described in the main text. The remaining 
columns, which horizontally sum to unity, give the distribution of this trade across industry 
groups.  
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Table A-2: Legal capacity and aid dependence (see note below) 
 
Country  Own legal capacity  Average partner legal capacity  Average aid dependence 
Albania 27.75  96.80  2.38 
Angola 5.15  93.60  0.45 
Antigua. & Bar.  48.11  88.45  0.18 
Argentina 51.96  70.52  0.00 
Armenia 27.70  89.56  1.22 
Australia 100.38  79.56  0.00 
Bahrain 55.09  71.79  0.00 
Bangladesh 33.17  99.46  0.14 
Barbados 68.88  65.10  0.03 
Belize 31.77  89.94  0.26 
Benin 34.65  51.17  0.31 
Bolivia 35.68  64.92  0.31 
Botswana 59.35  96.10  0.17 
Brazil 47.84  83.33  0.00 
Brunei Daruss.  53.24  84.38  0.00 
Bulgaria 34.60  85.87  0.00 
Burkina Faso  31.19  60.24  0.73 
Burundi 12.11  89.37  2.58 
Cambodia 24.20  101.27  0.74 
Cameroon 28.79  92.39  0.33 
Canada 106.58  102.50  0.00 
Central Afr Rep  13.58  94.89  2.50 
Chad 27.53  83.92  1.53 
Chile 79.36  81.73  0.00 
China 56.25  90.98  0.01 
Colombia 41.62  85.11  0.10 
Congo 11.30  80.74  0.05 
Costa Rica  56.64  91.92  -0.09 
Croatia 49.77  88.20  0.07 
Cuba 35.78  83.71  0.02 
Cyprus 70.46  85.67  0.27 
Czech Republic  64.68  89.98  0.46 
Côte d'Ivoire  28.30  79.38  0.19 
Dem. Rep. Congo  0.00  95.92  0.80 
Djibouti 17.96  74.16  0.38 
Dominica 26.86  72.15  0.94 
Dominican Rep.  33.41  105.12  0.05 
EC 99.35  81.34  0.00 
Ecuador 22.15  84.43  0.11 
Egypt 46.04  87.40  0.19 
El Salvador  38.95  86.44  0.24 
Estonia 59.39  94.13  0.68 
FYROM-Mac. 31.06  90.74  1.65 
Fiji 36.87  98.96  0.31 
Gabon 27.09  95.20  0.08 
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Country  Own legal capacity  Average partner legal capacity  Average aid dependence 
Gambia 28.81  86.44  1.27 
Georgia 26.52  74.06  0.49 
Ghana 39.06  90.11  0.60 
Grenada 37.46  78.23  0.09 
Guatemala 33.87  86.47  0.18 
Guinea 29.46  90.53  0.90 
Guinea-Bissau 15.98  56.33  0.98 
Guyana 34.19  93.59  0.97 
Haiti 9.23  105.95  2.04 
Honduras 30.77  99.50  1.44 
Hong Kong - 
China  83.42 83.97  0.00 
Hungary 65.67  93.47  0.39 
Iceland 88.81  97.19  0.00 
India 47.30  84.30  0.01 
Indonesia 35.30  84.60  0.15 
Israel 74.96  94.99  0.31 
Jamaica 36.00  97.42  0.04 
Japan 86.86  87.23  0.00 
Jordan 51.73  67.31  0.41 
Kenya 24.80  74.64  0.19 
Korea 69.46  83.50  0.00 
Kuwait 47.88  83.61  0.00 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 27.07  82.12  0.83 
Latvia 52.16  89.72  0.52 
Lesotho 33.06  105.21  0.33 
Lithuania 53.54  89.18  0.46 
Macao - China  60.95  99.70  0.00 
Madagascar 30.59  96.16  1.16 
Malawi 27.00  84.21  2.42 
Malaysia 67.33  91.04  0.01 
Maldives 46.71  88.40  0.08 
Mali 28.72  71.06  0.54 
Malta 59.49  94.11  0.05 
Mauritania 34.72  80.43  6.78 
Mauritius 54.22  96.02  0.27 
Mexico 56.89  103.50  0.00 
Moldova 23.04  86.33  0.93 
Mongolia 35.62  76.85  0.95 
Morocco 45.99  92.46  0.47 
Mozambique 31.03  78.52  1.77 
Myanmar 9.15  75.95  0.02 
Namibia 44.15  94.57  1.13 
Nepal 26.07  80.13  0.20 
New Zealand  91.65  87.23  0.00 
Nicaragua 26.34  91.35  1.29 
Niger 18.89  80.04  0.90 
Nigeria 17.68  87.87  0.03 
Norway 97.17  97.09  0.00 
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Country  Own legal capacity  Average partner legal capacity  Average aid dependence 
Oman 64.30  71.51  0.01 
Pakistan 31.41 86.55  0.10 
Panama 42.07 62.59  0.00 
Papua New Guinea  26.43  89.09  2.95 
Paraguay 15.98  62.87  0.04 
Peru 41.36  85.05 0.12 
Philippines 48.46  92.25  0.10 
Poland 65.70  92.64  0.32 
Qatar 60.29  82.17  0.00 
Romania 32.40  89.22  0.66 
Rwanda 27.67 75.00  1.27 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  33.46  102.09  0.09 
St Lucia  37.31  89.47  0.70 
St Vincent & the Gren.  33.16  85.46  0.78 
Saudi Arabia  43.97  83.75  0.00 
Senegal 41.51 73.24  0.81 
Sierra Leone  13.54  87.61  2.70 
Singapore 108.04  81.20  0.00 
Slovak Republic  50.67  87.31  0.53 
Slovenia 62.90 88.40  0.27 
Solomon Islands  14.42  72.10  1.31 
South Africa  57.81  78.14  0.05 
Sri Lanka  38.24  96.08  0.05 
Suriname 36.32  94.57  0.12 
Swaziland 26.25  80.22  0.31 
Switzerland 109.74  90.15  0.00 
Tanzania 31.37  75.88  0.50 
Thailand 51.98  88.92  0.06 
Togo 16.34  57.78  0.08 
Trinidad and Tobago  54.61  85.02  0.01 
Tunisia 63.40  94.88  0.65 
Turkey 45.86  91.81  0.05 
US 107.45  82.67  0.00 
Uganda 35.06  88.81  0.72 
United Arab Emirates  61.02  77.03  0.00 
Uruguay 57.95 67.72  0.00 
Venezuela 23.98  89.27  0.00 
Zambia 27.24  69.67  0.74 





Note: “Own legal capacity” is computed as described in the main text. “Average partner 
legal capacity” of a country i is each of its trade partners’ legal capacity weighted with the 
partner's share of total exports of country i. “Average aid dependence” is for a country i the 
weighted average of its net recepits of aid as a fraction of its GDP, where the weights are 
each donor's share of the total exports from i.   57





SECTION I (HS-1 – HS-5): Live animals, animal products 
SECTION II (HS-6 – HS-14): Vegetable products 
SECTION III (HS-15) Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; 
prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes   
SECTION IV  (HS-16 – HS-24): Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, spirits and vinegar; 
tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 
 
Mat1: 
SECTION V (HS 25-27): Mineral products  
SECTION XIII (68-70): Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar 
materials; ceramic products; glass and glassware    
 
Ch1:  
HS-28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-
earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes 




HS-30 Pharmaceutical products 
HS-33 33 Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations.   
 
Ch2:  
HS-32 Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other 
colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks.   
HS-34 Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, 
artificial waxes, prepared waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar 
articles, modelling pastes, "dental waxes" and dental preparations with a basis of plaster. 
HS-35 Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes.  
HS-36 Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible 
preparations.  
HS-37 Photographic or cinematographic goods.  
HS-38 Miscellaneous chemical products.  
 
Pla:  
SECTION VII (HS-39 – HS-40): Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof    
 
Mat2: 
SECTION VIII (HS-41 – HS-43): Raw hides and skins, leather, furskins and articles 
thereof; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of 
animal gut (other than silk-worm gut)    
SECTION XII (HS-64 – HS-67 except for HS-65): Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun 
umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof; prepared 
feathers and articles made therewith; artificial flowers; articles of human hair  
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Woo:  
SECTION IX (HS-44 – HS 46): Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal; cork and 
articles of cork; manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware 
and wickerwork    
HS-47 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) 
paper or paperboard.   
HS-48 Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard.   
 
Txl: 
SECTION XI (HS-50 – HS-63, HS-65): Textiles and textile articles   
HS-65 Headgear and parts thereof.   
 
Stl: 
HS-72 Iron and steel.  
HS-73 Articles of iron or steel.   
 
Met:  
SECTION XV (HS-74 – HS-83 except for HS-72, HS-73): Base metals and articles of base 
metal    
 
Mch:  
SECTION XVI (HS-84 – HS-85): Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical 
equipment; parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound 
recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles    
 
Vhl: 
SECTION XVII (HS-86 – HS-89): Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport 
equipment    
    
Man:  
SECTION XVIII (HS-90 – HS-92): Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, 
checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; clocks and watches; 
musical instruments; parts and accessories thereof;  
SECTION XIX (HS-93): Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof; 
SECTION XX (HS-94 – HS-96): Miscellaneous manufactured articles  
 
Oth: 
HS-49 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; 
manuscripts, typescripts and plans.   
SECTION XIV (HS-71): Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, 
precious metals, metals clad with precious metal and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; 
coin 
SECTION XXI (HS-97): works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques. 
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DS no  Official title of dispute 
1  Prohibition of imports of polyethylene and polypropylene 
2  Standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline 
3  Measures concerning the testing and inspection of agricultural products 
4  Standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline 
5  Measures concerning the shelf-life of products 
6  Imposition of import duties on automobiles from Japan under sections 301 and 304 of the trade act of 1974
7  Trade description of scallops 
8  Taxes on alcoholic beverages 
9  Duties on imports of cereals 
10  Taxes on alcoholic beverages 
11  Taxes on alcoholic beverages 
12  Trade description of scallops 
13  Duties on imports of grains 
14  Trade description of scallops 
15  Measures affecting the purchase of telecommunications equipment 
16  Regime for importation, sale and distribution of bananas 
17  Duties on imports of rice 
18  Measures affecting importation of salmon 
19  Import regime for automobiles 
20  Measures concerning the bottled water 
21  Measures concerning the importation of salomonids 
22  Measures affecting desiccated coconut 
23  Anti-dumping investigation in respect of imports of certain oil country tubular goods (OCTG) 
24  Restrictions on imports of cotton and man-made fibre underwear 
25  Implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments concerning rice 
26  Measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones) 
27  Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas 
28  Measures concerning sound recordings 
29  Restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products 
30  Countervailing duties on imports of desiccated coconut and coconut milk powder from Sri Lanka 
31  Certain measures concerning periodicals 
32  Measures affecting imports of women's and girls' woolcoats 
33  Measures affecting imports of woven wool shirts and blouses 
34  Restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products 
36  Patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products 
40  Laws, regulations and practices in the telecommunications procurement sector 
41  Measures concerning inspection of agricultural products 
42  Measures concerning sound recordings 
44  Measures affecting consumer photographic film and paper 
47  Restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products 
48  Measures affecting livestock and meat (hormones) 
49  Anti-dumping investigation regarding imports of fresh or chilled tomatoes from Mexico 
50  Patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products 
51  Certain automotive investment measures 
52  Certain measures affecting trade and investment in the automotive sector   60
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54  Certain measures affecting the automobile industry 
55  Certain measures affecting the automobile industry 
56  Measures affecting imports of footwear, textiles, apparel and other items 
57  Textile, clothing and footwear import credit scheme 
58  Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products 
59  Certain measures affecting the automobile industry 
60  Anti-dumping investigation regarding portland cement from Mexico 
61  Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products 
62  Customs classification of certain computer equipment 
63  Anti-dumping measures on imports of solid urea from the former German Democratic Republic 
64  Certain measures affecting the automobile industry 
65  Certain measures affecting trade and investment in the automotive sector 
66  Measures affecting imports of pork 
67  Customs classification of certain computer equipment 
68  Customs classification of certain computer equipment 
69  Measures affecting importation of certain poultry products 
72  Measures affecting butter products 
73  Procurement of a navigation satellite 
74  Measures affecting pork and poultry 
75  Taxes on alcoholic beverages 
76  Measures affecting agricultural products 
77  Measures affecting textiles, clothing and footwear 
78  Safeguard measure against imports of broom and corn brooms 
79  Patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products 
81  Certain measures affecting trade and investment in the automotive sector 
84  Taxes on alcoholic beverages 
85  Measures affecting textiles and apparel products 
87  Taxes on alcoholic beverages 
89  Imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of colour television receivers from Korea 
97  Countervailing duty investigation of imports of salmon from Chile 
98  Definitive safeguard measure on imports of certain dairy products 
99  Anti-dumping duty on dynamic random access memory semiconductors (drams) … from Korea 
100  Measures affecting imports of poultry products 
101  Anti-dumping investigation of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) from the United States 
102  Measures affecting pork and poultry 
105  Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas 
106  Subsidies provided to producers and exporters of automotive leather 
107  Export measures affecting hides and skins 
109  Taxes on alcoholic beverages 
110  Taxes on alcoholic beverages 
111  Tariff rate quota for imports of groundnuts 
112  Countervailing duty investigation against imports of buses from Brazil 
114  Patent protection of pharmaceutical products 
119  Anti-dumping measures on imports of coated woodfree paper sheets 
121  Safeguard measures on imports of footwear 
122  Anti-dumping duties on angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloysteel and H-beams from Poland 
123  Safeguard measures on imports of footwear 
126  Subsidies provided to producers and exporters of automotive leather 
132  Anti-dumping investigation of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) from the United States 
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133  Measures concerning the importation of dairy products and the transit of cattle 
134  Restrictions on certain import duties on rice 
135  Measures affecting asbestos and products containing asbestos 
137  Measures affecting imports of wood of conifers from Canada 
138  Imposition of CVDs on certain hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel products originating in the UK 
139  Certain automotive industry measures 
140  Anti-dumping investigations regarding unbleached cotton fabrics from India 
141  Anti-dumping duties on imports of cotton-type bed-linen from India 
142  Certain measures affecting the automotive industry 
143  Measure affecting import duty on wheat from Hungary 
144  Certain measures affecting the import of cattle, swine and grain from Canada 
145  Countervailing duties on imports of wheat gluten from the EC 
146  Measures affecting the automotive sector 
147  Tariff quotas and subsidies affecting leather 
148  Measure affecting import duty on wheat from Hungary 
151  Measures affecting textiles and apparel products (II) 
153  Patent protection on pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products 
154 Measures  affecting  differential  and favourable treatment of coffee 
156  Definitive anti-dumping measure on grey portland cement from Mexico 
157  Definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of drill bits from Italy 
158  Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas 
159  Safeguard measure on imports of steel products from the Czech Republic 
161  Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef 
164  Measures affecting imports of footwear 
165  Import measures on certain products from the EC 
166  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of wheat gluten from the EC 
167  Countervailing duty investigation with respect to live cattle from Canada 
168  Anti-dumping duties on certain pharmaceutical products from India 
169  Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef 
171  Patent protection for pharmaceuticals and test data protection for agricultural chemicals 
172  Measures relating to the development of a flight management system 
173  Measures relating to the development of a flight management system 
175  Measures affecting trade and investment in the motor vehicle sector 
177  Safeguard measure on imports of fresh, chilled and frozen lamb from New Zealand 
178  Safeguard measure on imports of lamb meat from Australia 
179  Anti-dumping measures on stainless steel plate in coils and stainless steel sheet and strip from Korea 
180  Reclassification on certain sugar syrups 
181  Safeguard measure on imports of plain polyester filaments from Thailand 
182  Ecuador - Provisional anti-dumping measure on cement from Mexico 
184  Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan 
185  Certain measures affecting imports of pasta from Costa Rica 
187  Provisional anti-dumping measure on imports of macaroni and spaghetti from Costa Rica 
189  Definitive anti-dumping measures on carton-board imports from Germany …. ceramic floor tiles from Italy 
190  Transitional safeguard measures on certain imports of woven fabrics of cotton … originating in Brazil 
191  Definitive anti-dumping measure on cement from Mexico 
192  Transitional safeguard measure on combed cotton yarn from Pakistan 
193  Measures affecting the transit and importation of swordfish 
195  Measures affecting trade and investment in the motor vehicle sector 
202  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of circular welded carbon quality line pipe from Korea 
203  Measures affecting trade in live swine   62
Table A-4 cont’d 
 
205  Import Prohibition on canned tuna with soybean oil 
206  Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on steel plate from India 
207  Price band system and safeguard measures relating to certain agricultural products 
208  Anti-dumping duty on steel and iron pipe fittings 
209  Measures affecting soluble coffee 
210  Administration of measures establishing customs duties for rice 
211  Definitive anti-dumping measures on steel rebar from Turkey 
212  Countervailing measures concerning certain products from the EC 
213  Countervailing duties on certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products from Germany 
214  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of steel wire rod and circular welded carbon quality line pipe 
215  Anti-dumping measures regarding polypropylene resins from Korea 
216  Provisional anti-dumping measure on electric transformers 
218  Countervailing duties on certain carbon steel products from Brazil 
219  Anti-dumping duties on malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings from Brazil 
220  Price band system and safeguard measures relating to certain agricultural products 
223  Tariff-rate quota on corn gluten feed from the US 
225  Anti-dumping duties on seamless pipe from Italy 
226  Provisional safeguard measure on mixtures of edible oils 
227 Taxes  on  cigarettes 
228  Safeguard Measures on Sugar 
229  Anti-Dumping Duties on Jute Bags from India 
230  Safeguard Measures and Modification of Schedules Regarding Sugar 
231  Trade Description of Sardines 
232  Measures Affecting the Import of Matches 
233  Measures Affecting the Import of Pharmaceutical Products 
235  Safeguard Measure on Imports of Sugar 
236  Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada 
237  Certain Import Procedures for Fresh Fruit 
238  Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Preserved Peaches 
240  Import Prohibition on Wheat and Wheat Flour 
241  Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil 
243  Rules of origin for textiles and apparel products 
244  Sunset review of anti-dumping duties on corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products from Japan 
245  Measures affecting the importation of apples 
247  Provisional anti-dumping measure on imports of certain softwood lumber from Canada 
248  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
249  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
250  Equalizing excise tax imposed by Florida on processed orange and grapefruit Products 
251  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
252  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
253  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
254  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
255  Tax treatment on certain imported products  
256  Import ban on pet food from Hungary  
257  Final countervailing duty determination with respect to certain softwood lumber from Canada  
258  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
259  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
260  Provisional safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
262  Sunset reviews of anti-dumping and CVDs on certain steel products from France and Germany 
263  Measures affecting imports of wine 
264  Final dumping determination on softwood lumber from Canada 
267  Subsidies on upland Cotton 
268  Sunset reviews of anti-dumping measures on oil country tubular goods from Argentina 
269  Customs classification of frozen boneless chicken cuts   63
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270  Certain measures affecting the importation of fresh fruit and vegetables 
271  Certain measures affecting the importation of fresh pineapple 
272  Provisional anti-dumping duties on vegetable oils from Argentina 
273  Measures affecting trade in commercial vessels  
274  Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products 
275  Import licensing measures on certain agricultural products 
277  Investigation of the International Trade Commission in softwood lumber from Canada 
278  Definitive safeguard measure on imports of fructose 
279  Import restrictions maintained under the export and import policy 2002-2007 
280  Countervailing duties on steel plate from Mexico 
281  Anti-dumping measures on cement from Mexico 
283  Export subsidies on sugar 
284  Certain measures preventing the importation of black beans from Nicaragua 
286  Customs classification of frozen boneless chicken cuts 
287  Quarantine regime for imports 
288  Definitive anti-dumping measures on blanketing from Turkey  
289  Additional duty on imports of pig-meat from Poland 
295  Definitive anti-dumping measures on beef and rice 
296  CVD investigation on dynamic random access memory semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea 
297  Measure affecting imports of live animals and meat products 
299 Countervailing  measures on dynamic random access memory chips from Korea 
300  Measures affecting the importation of cigarettes 
301  Measures affecting trade in commercial vessels 
302  Measures affecting the importation and internal sale of cigarettes 
303  Definitive safeguard measure on imports of medium density fibreboard  
304  Anti-dumping measures on imports of certain products from the EC and/or member states 
305  Measures affecting imports of textile and apparel products 
306  Anti-dumping measure on batteries from Bangladesh 
307  Aid for commercial vessels 
308  Tax measures on soft drinks and other beverages 
309  Value-added Tax on Integrated Circuits 
310  Determination of the International Trade Commission in Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada 
311  Reviews of countervailing duty on softwood lumber from Canada 
312  Anti-dumping duties on imports of certain paper from Indonesia 
313  Anti-dumping duties on certain flat rolled iron or non-alloy steel products from India 
314  Provisional countervailing measures on olive oil from EC 
316  Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
317  Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
323  Import quotas on dried laver and seasoned laver 
324  Provisional anti-dumping measures on shrimp from Thailand 
325  Anti-dumping determinations regarding stainless steel from Mexico 
326  Definitive safeguard measure on salmon 
327  Anti-dumping duties on matches from Pakistan 
328  Definitive Safeguard Measure on Salmon 
329  Tariff Classification of Certain Milk Products 
330  Countervailing Duties on Olive oil, Wheat Gluten and Peaches 
331  Anti-dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from Guatemala 
332  Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tires 
334  Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice 
335  Anti-dumping measure on shrimp from Ecuador 
336 Countervailing  Duties  on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea 
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337  Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway 
338  Provisional Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties on grain corn from the US 
339  Measures affecting imports of automobile parts 
340  Measures affecting imports of automobile parts 
341  Definitive countervailing measures on olive oil from the EC 
342  Measures affecting imports of automobile parts 
343  Measures relating to shrimp from Thailand 
345  Customs bond directive for merchandise subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties 
347  Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) 
348  Customs Measures on Importation of Certain Products from Panama 
349  Measures Affecting the Tariff Quota for Fresh or Chilled Garlic 
351  Provisional Safeguard Measure on Certain Milk Products 
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DS no  Complainants  Respondent  Industry groups 
1 Singapore  Malaysia  Pla 
2 Venezuela  US  Mt1 
3 US  Korea  Agr 
4 Brazil  US  Mt1 
5  US  Korea  Agr, Ch2, Man, Met, Oth, Pha, Pla 
6 Japan  US  Vhl 
7 Canada  EC  Agr 
8 EC  Japan  Agr 
9 Canada  EC  Agr 
10 Canada  Japan  Agr 
11 US  Japan  Agr 
12 Peru  EC  Agr 
13 US  EC  Agr 
14 Chile  EC  Agr 
15 EC  Japan  Agr,  Mch 
16  Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, US  EC  Agr 
17 Thailand  EC  Agr 
18 Canada  Australia  Agr 
19 India  Poland  Vhl 
20 Canada  Korea  Agr 
21 US  Australia  Agr 
22 Philippines  Brazil  Agr 
23 Mexico  Venezuela  Stl 
24 Costa  Rica  US  Txl 
25 Uruguay  EC  Agr 
26 US  EC  Agr 
27  Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, US  EC  Agr 
28 US  Japan  Mch 
29  Hong Kong – China  Turkey  Txl 
30 Sri  Lanka  Brazil  Agr 
31 US  Canada  Oth 
32 India  US  Txl 
33 India  US  Txl 
34 India  Turkey  Txl 
36 US  Pakistan  Ch1,  Pha 
40 EC  Korea  Mch 
41 US  Korea  Agr 
42 EC  Japan  Mch 
44 US  Japan  Ch2 
47 Thailand  Turkey  Txl 
48 Canada  EC  Agr 
49 Mexico  US  Agr 
50 US  India  Ch1,  Pha 
51 Japan  Brazil  Vhl 
52 US  Brazil  Vhl 
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54 EC  Indonesia  Vhl 
55 Japan  Indonesia  Vhl 
56 US  Argentina  Mt2,  Txl 
57 US  Australia  Mt2 
58  India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand  US  Agr 
59 US  Indonesia  Vhl 
60 Mexico  Guatemala  Mt1 
61 Philippines  US  Agr 
62 US  EC  Mch 
63 EC  US  Ch1 
64 Japan  Indonesia  Vhl 
65 US  Brazil  Vhl 
66 EC  Japan  Agr 
67 US  United  Kingdom  Mch 
68 US  Ireland  Mch 
69 Brazil  EC  Agr 
72 New  Zealand  EC  Agr 
73 EC  Japan  Vhl 
74 US  Philippines  Agr 
75 EC  Korea  Agr 
76 US  Japan  Agr 
77 EC  Argentina  Mt2,  Txl 
78 Colombia  US  Man 
79 EC  India  Ch1,  Pha 
81 EC  Brazil  Vhl 
84 US  Korea  Agr 
85 EC  US  Txl 
87 EC  Chile  Agr 
89 Korea  US  Mch 
97 Chile  US  Agr 
98 EC  Korea  Agr 
99 Korea  US  Mch 
100 EC  US  Agr 
101 US  Mexico  Agr 
102 US  Philippines  Agr 
105 Panama  EC  Agr 
106 US  Australia  Mt2 
107 EC  Pakistan  Mt2 
109 US  Chile  Agr 
110 EC  Chile  Agr 
111 Argentina  US  Agr 
112 Brazil  Peru  Vhl 
114 EC  Canada  Pha 
119 Switzerland  Australia  Woo 
121 EC  Argentina  Mt2 
122 Poland  Thailand  Stl 
123 Indonesia  Argentina  Mt2 
126 US  Australia  Mt2 
132 US  Mexico  Agr 
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133 Switzerland  Slovak  Republic  Agr 
134 India  EC  Agr 
135 Canada  EC  Mt1 
137 Canada  EC  Woo 
138 EC  US  Stl 
139 Japan  Canada  Vhl 
140 India  EC  Txl 
141 India  EC  Txl 
142 EC  Canada  Vhl 
143 Hungary  Slovak  Republic  Agr 
144 Canada  US  Agr 
145 EC  Argentina  Agr 
146 EC  India  Vhl 
147 EC  Japan  Mt2 
148 Hungary  Czech  Republic  Agr 
151 EC  US  Txl 
153 Canada  EC  Ch1,  Pha 
154 Brazil  EC  Agr 
156 Mexico  Guatemala  Mt1 
157 EC  Argentina  Met 
158  Honduras, Mexico, Guatemala, Panama, US  EC  Agr 
159 Czech  Republic  Hungary  Stl 
161 US  Korea  Agr 
164 US  Argentina  Mt2 
165  EC  US  Agr, Ch2, Mch, Mt2,  
Oth, Pha, Pla, Txl, Woo 
166 EC  US  Agr 
167 Canada  US  Agr 
168 India  South  Africa  Ch1,  Pha 
169 Australia  Korea  Agr 
171 US  Argentina  Ch1,  Pha 
172 US  EC  Vhl 
173 US  France  Vhl 
175 US  India  Vhl 
177 New  Zealand  US  Agr 
178 Australia  US  Agr 
179 Korea  US  Stl 
180 Canada  US  Agr 
181 Thailand  Colombia  Txl 
182 Mexico  Ecuador  Ch1,  Mt1 
184 Japan  US  Stl 
185  Costa Rica  Trinidad and Tobago  Agr 
187  Costa Rica  Trinidad and Tobago  Agr 
189 EC  Argentina  Mt1,  Woo 
190 Brazil  Argentina  Txl 
191 Mexico  Ecuador  Mt1 
192 Pakistan  US  Txl 
193 EC  Chile  Agr 
195 US  Philippines  Vhl 
202 Korea  US  Stl 
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203 US  Mexico  Agr 
205 Thailand  Egypt  Agr 
206 India  US  Stl 
207 Argentina  Chile  Agr 
208 Brazil  Turkey  Stl 
209 Brazil  EC  Agr 
210 US  EC  Agr 
211 Turkey  Egypt  Stl 
212 EC  US  Agr, Stl 
213 EC  US  Stl 
214 EC  US  Stl 
215 Korea  Philippines  Pla 
216 Brazil  Mexico  Mch 
218 Brazil  US  Stl 
219 Brazil  EC  Stl 
220 Guatemala  Chile  Agr 
223 US  EC  Agr 
225 EC  US  Stl 
226 Argentina  Chile  Agr 
227 Chile  Peru  Agr 
228 Colombia  Chile  Agr 
229 India  Brazil  Txl 
230 Colombia  Chile  Agr 
231 Peru  EC  Agr 
232 Chile  Mexico  Ch2 
233 India  Argentina  Pha 
235 Poland  Slovak Republic  Agr 
236 Canada  US  Woo 
237 Ecuador  Turkey  Agr 
238 Chile  Argentina  Agr 
240 Hungary  Romania  Agr 
241 Brazil  Argentina  Agr 
243 India  US  Txl 
244 Japan  US  Stl 
245 US  Japan  Agr 
247 Canada  US  Woo 
248 EC  US  Mch, Stl 
249 Japan  US  Mch, Stl 
250 Brazil  US  Agr 
251 Korea  US  Mch, Stl 
252 China  US  Mch, Stl 
253 Switzerland  US  Mch, Stl 
254 Norway  US  Mch, Stl 
255 Chile  Peru  Agr 
256 Hungary  Turkey  Agr 
257 Canada  US  Woo 
258 New Zealand  US  Mch, Stl 
259 Brazil  US  Mch, Stl 
260 US  EC  Stl 
262 EC  US  Stl 
263 Argentina  EC  Agr 
264 Canada  US  Woo 
267 Brazil  US  Txl 
268 Argentina  US  Stl   69
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270 Philippines  Australia  Agr 
271 Philippines  Australia  Agr 
272 Argentina  Peru  Agr 
273 EC  Korea  Vhl 
274 Chinese  Taipei  US  Mch,  Stl 
275 US  Venezuela  Agr 
277 Canada  US  Woo 
278 Argentina  Chile  Agr 
279  EC  India  Agr, Ch1, Ch2, Mch,  
Mt1, Oth, Pha, Stl, Vhl, Woo 
280 Mexico  US  Stl 
281 Mexico  US  Mt1 
283 Thailand  EC  Agr 
284 Nicaragua  Mexico  Agr 
286 Thailand  EC  Agr 
287 EC  Australia  Agr 
288 Turkey  South  Africa  Txl 
289 Poland  Czech  Republic  Agr 
295 US  Mexico  Agr 
296 Korea  US  Mch 
297 Hungary  Croatia  Agr 
299 Korea  EC  Mch 
300 Honduras  Dominican  Republic  Agr 
301 Korea  EC  Vhl 
302 Honduras  Dominican  Republic  Agr 
303 Chile  Ecuador  Woo 
304  EC  India  Ch1, Ch2, Pla, Stl, Txl, Woo 
305 US  Egypt  Txl 
306 Bangladesh  India  Mch 
307 Korea  EC  Vhl 
308 US  Mexico  Agr 
309 US  China  Mch 
310 Canada  US  Agr 
311 Canada  US  Woo 
312 Indonesia  Korea  Woo 
313 India  EC  Stl 
314 EC  Mexico  Agr 
316 US  EC  Vhl 
317 EC  US  Vhl 
323 Korea  Japan  Agr 
324 Thailand  US  Agr 
325 Mexico  US  Stl 
326 Chile  EC  Agr 
327 Pakistan  Egypt  Ch2 
328 Norway  EC  Agr 
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329 Mexico  Panama  Agr 
330 EC  Argentina  Agr 
331 Guatemala  Mexico  Stl 
332 EC  Brazil  Vhl 
334 US  Turkey  Agr 
335 Ecuador  US  Agr 
336 Korea  Japan  Mch 
337 Norway  EC  Agr 
338 US  Canada  Agr 
339 EC  China  Vhl 
340 US  China  Vhl 
341 EC  Mexico  Agr 
342 Canada  China  Vhl 
343 Thailand  US  Agr 
345 India  US  Agr 
347 US  EC  Vhl 
348 Panama  Colombia  Mt2 
349 Argentina  EC  Agr 
351 Argentina  Chile  Agr   71
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337  Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway 
338  Provisional Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties on grain corn from the US 
339  Measures affecting imports of automobile parts 
340  Measures affecting imports of automobile parts 
341  Definitive countervailing measures on olive oil from the EC 
342  Measures affecting imports of automobile parts 
343  Measures relating to shrimp from Thailand 
345  Customs bond directive for merchandise subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties 
347  Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) 
348  Customs Measures on Importation of Certain Products from Panama 
349  Measures Affecting the Tariff Quota for Fresh or Chilled Garlic 
351  Provisional Safeguard Measure on Certain Milk Products 
 
  
 